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t 
Twenty-seven years ago,  almost  to  the  day,  the  Second 
World  conflict  came  to  a  close.  The  end  of  the  war  found  European 
countries in a  state of exhaustion,  civil structures almost  non-
existent,  factories  destroyed.  One  had  to start  from  nothing and 
the  will for  restarting seemed  stifled by  a  crisis of discouragement 
and mistrust.  A large portion of  the  population  was  still suffering 
from  the  recent  events  with an  attitude of resignation,  of indifference 
of passive  protest:  "Ohne  uns";  "without  us". 
The  rapid  succession  and multiplicity of  events,  the  new 
problems arising which  today's  society  denounces,  make  that  epoch 
seem  far  away;  however,  they  cannot  make  one  forget  the  constructive 
ability with  which  industry,  above  all,  responded  and  reacted  to  this 
feeling of  bewilderment.  If I  dwell  on  this topic,  it is to  recall 
briefly our  recent  history,  simply  because it seems  right  to  me  to 
underline  the  worth  and  continuity of  the  role  played  by  industry 
and  the  constructive  thoughts  which  derived  from  it for  the  development 
of society,  in the  changeable  and  varied needs it has  since  expressed. 
When  the  productive  and  industrial structures had  to  be~ 
completely rebuilt starting  from  nothing,  they  were  weak  and  uncertain; 
European  businessmen,  with  a  good  deal  of  courage  and  foresight, 
understood  that  the  problems  of reconstruction  and  development  could 
be  solved only  in  the  framework  of a  policy of real international 
economic  collaboration. 2 
This  then  was  the  attitude of  European  industry;  it helped 
and  favoured  a  policy of gradual  freeing  of  the  exchange  of  goods, 
services and  currencies,  adhering  faithfully  to  the  establishment  of 
the  OEEC  and  the  European Union  of Payments.  This  policy represented 
a  fundamental  economic  choice  and  a  confirmation of faith  in  the 
ideals of political liberty;  it gave  industry  the  task  of setting in 
motion  a  process  of  expansion,  supported  by  quantitative  and 
qualitative mobilisation  of its own  resources.  It  was  necessary, 
moreover,  to  produce  in greater quantities at  ever  lower  costs,  to 
make  available materially  and  spiritually that  which  was  needed  by 
the  collectivity,  to  inculcate  once  a~ain in  everyone  a  confidence 
in his  own  creative ability and  his  own  future. 
1rhis  is what  society 
was  seeking at  the  end  of  the  forties  and  throughout  the  fifties; 
industry met  these  needs  whilst  safeguarding at least  one  of  the 
four  fundamental  freedoms:  freedom  of  want. 
In  the  same  way  as it received  favourably  the  freeing of 
exchanges,  European  industry  became  also  the  real  stimulant  in 
creating  the  European  Community,  which  developed  into  a  reality during 
the  sixties.  We  felt  then  that  the  vast  process  of  harmonization  and 
co-ordination  which  would  follow  would  benefit  not  only  industry 
itself but,  above  all,  the  social  and  civil progress  of all  the 
participating countries.  We  realised  then  that  the  creation of  a 
single large market  would  give  positive  results measurable  not  only 
in  economic  terms  but  also  in political ones  for  the  drive it would 
give  for  attaining an  integration at all levels  between  the 
Community  countries. 
Looking  back  to  the  distant  and  recent  past,  we  notice  that 
this act  of faith has  found  a  clear expression 3 
in the facts;  today,  the Community  is capable of reducing sharply 
internal economic  and  social instabilities whilst externally it 
is preparing itself to meet  the increasing demands  for  co-ope~ 
ration and integration encouraged by the evolution in political, 
social  and  economic  relations which will characterize World 
co-habitation in the  seventies. 
I  do  not at all underestimate  the difficulties which 
this system of open competition and necessary competitiveness 
has created for  industry in free countries,  whilst  stimulating 
at the  same  time  technological  and productive  development;  the 
difficulties which have beset certain currencies,  tensions  in 
the capital markets,  the  increasing structural deficits in the 
balance  of payments  of certain countries,  monetary restrictions, 
the recent protectionist manifestations  and restrictions in 
international exchanges,  all these constitute expressions of the 
continued wish for  the  removal  of frontiers  and  has  already 
been  achieved in  international economic  co-operation. 
However,  it is npt  on  these aspects that  I  propose  to dwell; 
\ 
the object of my  report is only that of underlining the urgent 
need for  the Community  not  to limit itself to the protection 
of results already obtained but of projecting new  aims  for 
itself. 
Necessity of a  "real Community". 
The  agreements  reached in 1971  for  a  gradual  fulfilment 
of an Economic  and Monetary Union of the Community  and for  the 
implantation of the Third Programme  for Medium  Term  Economic 
Policy are moving  in practice in the direction required and our 
wish is that  they may  find the possibility of a  practical 
application. 
But  what  in my  view is now  urgent is for  the Community  to 
become  as  quickly as possible  a  11real Community",  in which  a  policy 4 
worked out democratically and with the participation of all 
shall allow for  a  strategic action to be  mapped  out  for  the 
confrontation of common  problems  in the  interest not  oru.y  of 
a  few but of everyone  - in a  new  bond of world stability,  the 
contribution of its own  civilisation and of its own  experience. 
Only  through  a  full  awareness  of this necessity can Community 
countries evaluate that which  has  already been  achieved  and, 
in the present  state of the world  situation,  change  into reality 
the plans  which  seem  realisable whilst  removing  the  serious  danger 
which can already be  foreseen.  In other words,  it is essential 
to  face  with  a  sense or urgency  and with,diligence  the basic 
problem of a  gradual  and  reasonable co-ordination between  the 
economic  and  social policies of our countries,  above  and  beyond 
purely commercial  and  monetary considerations. 
The  business world is directly and keenly  interested in 
this irreversible evolution;  I  even  think  that it is the best 
qualified social element  to help  the political world  to understand 
the necessity and  to act energetically and  promptly for  the 
fulfilment  of this  "reform"  which  I  do  not hesitate to qualify 
as historical.  This  is the ''reformn  which ·-N·ill  enl  iqhten 
tomorrow's  society in  a  contest which  shows  always  more  vividly 
how  erroneous  and  dangerous  is the  concept  of absolute political 
power,  it would  be  wrong  to  draw up  the numerous  reforms  which 
today's  society needs within  the  narrow limits of national 
borders.  For this to  be  possible,  it requires,  however  that all 
social  forces  realise that only  a  "real Community"  can  solve  the 
many  problems  wherever  they may  occur. 
To  this end,  the Community  will  have  to  acquire  its own 
distinctive personality to express  a  real political will.  Much 
has certainly been  done  up  to  now  but  this is no  longer  enough. 
The  Community  has  prepared interesting and valid proposals 
on  important  subjects like  the  Economic  and  Monetary Union,  the 
policy of relations with Third Countries  and policies on  agri-
culture,  social matters  and energy.  More  often than not, 5 
their fulfilment  has not  been possible;  when  it has been,  it has 
given negative or only partial results.  This  failure is due  to 
the fact  that only a  "real Community",  capable of expressing 
democratically its own  overall  "policy" can enforce  a  strategic 
action in which  the various political and  sectoral elements  find 
their settlements in terms of harmonization and compatibility. 
Through want  of such policy,  industry has  had  to bear the 
main consequences,  above all, during the Sixties.  It will suffice 
to think of difficulties arising from  the ever faster technological 
progress  and  sharper international competition;  the necessity to 
adjust conditions of competitiveness to the new  dimensions  o£ 
markets,  in the  absence of an institutional framework  which, 
whilst harmonizing  instruments  on norms,  legislation and  adminis-
tration of a  single country,  helps enterprises to  surmount  the 
increasing problems  of organizational,  economical,  financial, 
social  and commercial  aspects. 
Even  in the presence of such difficulties,  European  industry 
has  shown  an unequalled ability and quality for dynamism  and  for 
gradual  adaptation to economic  and social changes,  these qualities 
can be  seen through  the considerable economic  and  social expansion 
o£  the Community  where  industry has  been the  dominant  factor. 
Today,  industry finds itself faced with a  new  reality,  new 
demands,  with the contest of traditional systems  and values.  Latent 
and long-neglected needs  are rediscovered and exposed,  sometimes 
irraticnally,  in an  impetuous  search for higher levels of well-bein 
and  justice which humanity believes can be  attained through  a 
better propagation and  use of knowledge,  of techniques  and 
available resources. 6 
Imbalances  to  eliminate 
These  demands  are  due  frequently  to  a  deep  rooted  want  of 
stability but  today's  incompatibility is fully  aware  of  this in  a 
background  of general  and  wider  progress.  I  refer,  above  all,  to 
territorial imbalances  which  require  decisive  re-balancing  so  as  to 
secure  for  the  populations  of large  regional  areas,  particularly 
the  Community's  peripheric  zones,  a  fairer  penetration  in  the  circuit 
of general  economic  development  so  that  they  too  can  attain  the 
higher  levels of material  and  spiritual well-being  they  yearn  for. 
The  business  world  is ready  to  accept  this  new  challenge;  as 
in  the  past,  it has  taken  upon  itself economic  and  social reconstruc-
tions  and  it accepts  also  the  wider  and  various  responsibilities 
connected  with  the  needs  of  today's industrial  sector;  it asknowledges 
that  industry is an  instrument  at  the  service  of  the  community  and 
that  the  contribution made  by  enterprises  to  the  productive  and 
technological  development  is an  indispensable  element  to  reach  the 
fundamental  objec~ives which  any  industrialised society  aims  at. 
At  the  same  time,  used  as it is  to  operate  in an  international 
sphere  in  terms  of  competition,  of realistic reconciliation of  needs 
and  conditions  always  diversified and  frequently  contrasting, 
spurred  by  a  taste  for  risks  which  is its particular characteristic, 
the  world  of  industry has  already felt,  perhaps  more  through 
intuition than  design,  the  opportunities  which  would  have  been  offered 
to its development,  and,  in general,  to  a  ereater extent  to  the 
economic  development  of  European  countries,  by  a  radical  modific~tinn 
in  the  traditional  formulation  of  economic, social  and  cultural 
activities. 7 
Our  democratic  society,  however,  is based on  a  pluralist 
system where  the common  process of development  must  be  borne by 
numerous  and co-ordinated decision-making centres;  it is necessary 
therefore,  to avoid  any  temptation at self-sufficiency but,  on 
the contrary to solicit all the members  of the  society  :  political, 
syndical  and  intellectual,  so  that they may  participate according 
to. their own  role and  their own  responsability,  to the solution 
of common  problems. 
In this formulation,  certain sides contest  and undervalue 
the need  to produce wealth and whilst  a  different distribution 
of resources  and  a  continuous  improvement  of social benefits  and 
conditions of life are  invoked by  them,  they forget  that economic 
growth is a  prejudicial condition in the civil progress of 
society and  since industry is a  prime mover  of such  growth,  it is 
essential tpat it should have  the possibility of carrying out 
efficiently its first function - that of leading. 
Political powers  are,  above all,  the ones  which  should be 
aware  of this mutual  relationship,  assessing rightly the difficul-
ties industry has  to overcome  in the every day international 
contest;  these powers  must understand  the urgent need for 
developing  a  common  industrial policy which ensures  that  the 
conditions necessary to enterprises aiming  to operate  in a  rree 
and enlarged market,  can put  to maximum  value  the large oppor-
tunities offered whilst,  at the  same  time,  facing outside compe-
tition  on  the world market.  Enterprises know  that international 
competition does  not  allow for errors but  they also know  that 
the world market  is their real  frontier and are ready,  therefore, 
to move  in this sense. 
As  the initiative of the European Commission  for  the 
completion of a  common  industrial policy,  industry in the 
Community  has  given  and will  continue to give its support  and its 
full  collaboration. 8 
It is necessary  today  for  Governments  of  Member  Countries 
to  conform  to  such  initiatives.  The  freeing of  exchange  is not  in 
itself sufficient;  the  many  technical,  administrative  and  fiscal 
obstacles must  be  removed  as  hitherto  they  make  the  free  movement 
of  goods  difficult,  they  influence  the  income  and  the  cost  of industrial 
production.  It is necessary,  therefore,  that  the  States adopt  a 
policy of effective  integration and  freedom  through  the  harmonization 
of  the  respective  regulations and  norms. 
But  an  industrial policy  which  proposes  to  encourage  a  still 
stronger productive  development  implies also  the  possiblity  for 
industry  to  ~nlarge its presence,  not  occasionally but  under  stable 
conditions,  in  the  international markets;  that is to  say  that  a 
strategy of penetration based  not  only  on  increased exports but  also 
on  the  international movement  of capital in  firms  of international 
character is required.  Such  policy must  allow industry  to  enlarge 
its productive  limits also  qualitatively by  aligning itself to  the 
dynamism  of processes  achieved  in advanced  countries,  by  a  speedier 
structural flexibility,  by  a  better sectoral  selection and  by 
acquiring more  rapidly results of  techical-scientific research and 
improvements. 
This is a  matter of European  industry  being able  to  respond 
in an  opportune  way  to  foreign  conditioning.  This  stipulation is 
deduced  in  the  first  place  from  the  strength and  size  of  the  productive 
structures in  the  industrially and  technolorrically  more  advanced 
zones  outside  the  Community. 
To  this effect,  the  Community  must  be  aware  of  two  kinds  of 
dangers  which  may  occur  and  which  must  be  avoided:  the  one  of  not 
being  ready  to  participate  through  insufficient 9 
skill and cohesion to  the new  understanding of world stability; 
the other,  of provoking  in the rest of the world a  dangerous 
hostility in confrontations,  through  the  incapacity of linking 
its own  strategies to  the  legitimate interests of others. 
Both dangers are serious and only a  "real Community"  can 
suitably face  them. 
The  increasing participation of developing countries in 
international  and economic  affairs,  imposes  in its turn a  common 
external policy to the Community. 
This policy must  not  have merely  a  commercial  character 
but must  also  seek  to evaluate the complementary character 
which exists between the Community  and  these countries in 
relations which take account of reciprocal interests and, 
moreover,  the overall  and world aspects of these relations. 
Simultaneously,  there is a  need of new  ideas  and methodology, 
which respects  the particular sensitivity of those countries 
who  recently acquired their political independence with a 
prejudicial renouncement  of that concept of  "aid" which  in the 
past has marked  the relations between developed countries  and 
developing ones.  There  is a  need,  therefore,  for solutions 
which permit  the Third World  to have  access  to  the  inheritance 
of culture,  science,  and experience of more  advanced nations  and, 
thus,  to make  possible  their economic  development  in a  way 
related to the development of more  advanced  economies.  The 
Community  has  already initiated with the  AASM  a  form  of associa-
tion which  includes in itself the principles mentioned  above; 
however,  only a  "real Community"  will have  the ability and  the 
possibility of £ulfiling such policy in a  valid way. 
If in the face  of external engagements  and problems 
which  I  have  mentioned,  the role of Community  co-operation is 
fundamental,  it appears  no  less important  to permit all social 
components,  and in particular,  industry,  to  respond  to  the 
requests of a  social  and civil nature now  being made  inside the 
Community. 10 
I  have  already underlined why  the  present  regional  instabilities 
lend  themselves  badly  to  a  reconciliation  with  the  needs  of  a  co-
ordinated and  overall  development  of  the  Community.  Industry is 
aware  of  the  necessity  that  such  instabilities be  overcome  decisively 
and  urgently.  Their persistence  would  only  accentuate  the  gravity 
of  the  situation and  could,  in  a  short  period of  time,  prejudice 
not  only  the  whole  process  of  economic  expansion,  but  also  the 
possibility of  shapinganEurope  which is united politically,  socially 
and  culturally,  and  which all desire. 
It is my  firm  belief,  based  on  past  and  recent  experience, 
that  the  objectives  of territorial re-balance  inside  the 
Community  will not  be  attainable later through  national  policies only 
but  require  a  common  and  co-ordinated effort,  an  effort  which  aims 
at  the  completion  of institutional  conditions,  the  infra-structural, 
economic,  social  and  financial  ones  necessary  so  that  capital is 
induced  to  flow  towards  work  and  not  the  other  way  round,  so  that 
industry  may  responsibly  exercise its function  of leading,  so  that 
social  tensions are  lessened  and  cut  down  disparity,  even 
cultural,  incompatible  with  human  and  political purposes  inherent 
with  the  concept  itself of  the  Community. 
The  improvement  in  the  standard  of living  as  I  have  already 
said,  is the  second  main  objective  to  draw  the  attention  and 
pledge  of  industry  in  the  ambit  of eeneral  problems  linked  to  civil 
and  social  developmen~of the  Community;  these  attention  and  pledge, 
the  industrial  classes  propose  to  express  through  the  contribution 
of  their experience  and  of  their ability  to  adopt  new  ways. With  regard  to  this objective,  we  know  which  argument  of 
particular stress and  increasing importance  connects  productive 
development  and  technological  advances  on  the  one  hand;  degeneration 
and  pollution of natural  surroundings  on  the other.  It has  caused 
some  certainly interesting appraisals and  accusations  and mistaken 
interpretations of past and  present  phenomena  which  I  think it is 
opportune  to  put right  ~nd I  will set out  the real  terms  of the 
problem. 
I  have  already mentioned  that during  the fifties and  the 
early part of the sixties,  industrial development  reasoning and, 
therefor~ that of scientific research and  technology  was  inspired 
mainly  by  the  need  to  produce  always better and  in larger quantities 
at lower  costs,  through  the better use  of resources. 
If this has  largely contributed  to  satisfying the  primary 
need  of  a  quantitative  order,  it has  forcibly left in the  shade 
certain qualitative aspects,of economic  progress.  There  followed 
amongst  others,  serious problems  of ecological  surrounding  which led 
to  an  increasing awareness  of  the  worth  of irreplaceable advantages 
which are essential  to  humanity,  also  a  clear intention to direct 
the  imposing  capacity of progress of which  we  disposed  towards  a 
qualitative  improvement  of  human  living conditions,  taken individually 
or in groups. 
Problems  to  be  solved.  I  think  I  can state that  industry is fully 
conscious  of  the necessity of rethinking and  of setting its own 
objectives accordingly.  However,  for  such  process  to  be  spread in 
the  countries of the  Community,  we  must  realise that single or 
incoherent actions are  no  longer sufficient. 
In other words,  such  problems as,for instance,the 
protection of surroundings  from  pollution  can  find  their solution 
only  through  the  co-ordination and  increased efficiency of all sectors 
and  not  only of industry. 12 
On  the  contrary,  legislation  by  individual  couH ....  _ 
connection is  insufficent;  it does  not  answer  any  of  the  common 
charges,  it is even  frequently  contradictory.  The  general  tendency 
is for  industry  to  be  made  to  bear all  the  responsibility whilst, 
in  fact,  it represents but  a  small  element  in  the  process  of pollution. 
The  relative  toleration mareins  are  evaluated differently 
from  one  country  to  another,  from  one  sector  to  another.  A  well 
thought  out  and  progressive  limitation of  those  margins  involves 
costs  which  increase  proportionally.  Different  policies in thin 
matter  could  have  very  serious  repercussions  on  the  more  economical 
use  of resources  and  at international  competition level.  If,  as 
it seems  reasonable  to  suppose,  the  major  responsibility  for  a  broad 
and  decisive  ~olicy of  remedy  should  fall  on  the  shoulders of 
national  communities,  on  the  budgets  of  the  various  States and  in 
the  end,  on  consumers,  the  foreseeable  entity of  the  onus  would 
seriously affect  the  social-economic  policies of  the  single nations. 
This  is a  particularly  important  example  of  the  present 
situation.  Multinational  co-operation  in major  programmes  of 
scientific  and  technological  research is  just another  valid  example; 
these  programmes  will  have  to  take  increasingly  into  account 
qualitative  considerations apart  from  quantitative  ones,  evaluate 
and  encourage  the  direct  use  industry is prepared  and  able  to  ~ive 
for  their better fulfilment. 
Closely linked  to  technological  development  are  also  the 
problems  of large  industrial  installations  for  basic  products;  in 
my  opinion,  these  problems  deserve  being referred  to  again  since  they 
are  also  apt  to  condition  the  future  economic  good  order  of  a  "real 
Community".  The  fact  in itself that  in  these  sectors  the  optimal 
dimension is constantly  increasing  together  with  ever  heavier  charges 
for  research 13 
and  technological modernisation make  it possible  to  foresee  the 
practical danger  arising or already present in certain sectors, 
of  an  important  surplus production  which will  jeopardise  the  economic 
stability of  the  enterprises involved,its  prospects of economical 
use  and  fair profits  from  the  investments  concerned.  We  need  only 
quote  the  now  famous  case  of  ethylene,  where  national projects  from 
the  USSR,  Austria and  Italy foresee  surplus availabilities for  which 
one  cannot  think of adequate  outlets.  It is clear,  therefore,  that 
also  in  t~is field,  efficient co-operation will be  necessary at 
Community level to  avoid  that  the  dangers referred  to  should become 
reality and  perturb  the  economic  development  of  the  Community. 
I  would  like  to  reserve  a  last fleeting allusion to  social 
problems  which hitherto  have  been  considered as of  the  resort of 
individual States but  which  cannot  now  fail to  interest a  Community 
sincerely wishing  to  be  such  and  which affect  directly its industrial 
component.  I  refer  to  problems  of interior  emigration,  of housing, 
transport,  health  services  and  education at all levels;  these  have 
many  sided aspects but  they  amalgamate  coherently at  the  demand, 
today it is general  and  urgent,  for  a  substantial  improvement  in 
commu~ity living and  for  the  satisfaction of  the  more  elementary  needs. 
Conclusion.  In order  to  solve  these  problem~ it is necessary  in my 
opinion  that all of us  should  be  aware  of a  new  reality.  It can  be 
summarised  in the  "overal1  character" of  the  problems  which  have 
received our attention and  which  pre-occupy  us.  This  overall 
aspect  necessitates overcoming  the  present 14 
social-economic  instability and  the  co-ordinated  evaluation of  the 
contribution  that  each  social  element  can  and  must  express  for  the 
fulfilment  of  a  better  community  way  of living. 
I  am  quite  convinced  that  to  this  end  the  contribution of 
the  business entity cannot  be  substituted and  is  vital.  In 
speaking of industrial society,  a  critical if not  outright  contemp-
tuous  shade  of meaning  frequently  and  easily appears  yet  I  believe 
very  few  today  would  be  prepared  to  do  away,  even if only  in part, 
with  what  industrial civilisation has  made  possible  in  terms  of 
progress  and  well-being.  The  important  thing is that  this industrial 
civilisation should  know  how  to  live  up  to  the  new  needs  and  apply 
itself and  succeed  in making itself kindly-considered,  if not  "loved". 
Maybe  important  changes  will  be  required,  not  excluding  the 
search  for  new  patterns but,  up  to  now  no  clear picture  has  emerr,ed 
nor  any  attractive results. 
The  European  Economic  Community  with its  i~pressive economic 
strength,  its splendid tradition of civilisation and  culture,  its 
unsurpassed  creative abilities,  can  prove  to  be  the  real  medium 
for  the  fulfilment  of such  new  patterns of life in  a  community. 
To  achieve  such  an  attrative aim,  the  pJ.edge  of  everyone  is 
required,  from  businessmen  to  workers,  from  politicians  to 
administrators  and  legislators. 
I  firmly  believe  social  communities  of  each  of  our 
countries  have  everything  to  gain  from  this mutual  relation  of 
interests and  from  a  co-ordinated  decision  on  specific  problems. 
The  time  available  for  the  realisation of  this  "true  Community" 
is unfortunately  short;  at  world  level,  big moves  are  being  made 
which  will  decide  the  fate  of  fr~countries.  The  important  thing is for 15 
the  European  Economic  Community  to participate in it with  ''cards in 
order"  and  above all,  with  the  weight  and  prestige which  belong  to 
it.  But  for  this to  be  realised,  a  unity of interests and  objectives 
is necessary,  this alone  can  give  to its presence  the  determinant 
efficacy  which  vie  with it. CONPEREHCE  · 
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The  too  short  time  allowed did not make  it possible 
to give  figures  or details, but further  information can 
be  supplied  ~hen the  oral  statement is being presented. 
The  general title concerns In0.ustrialization and 
Society. 
This means  that the· problem mua1i  be  widened  to cover 
all as,ects of Community  policy and  that consequently  there 
can be  no  question  of merely  setting out  the  problems  and 
prospects  of industrial development. 
I  - THE  PRESENT  SITUATION  AND  FORESEEAELE  FUTURE  DEVELOPMF;NTS  _..  ...  .  ........... ~~  .............  .._.~ 
Before  examining  the  problema  connected with industrial-
ization. it 1~ indispensfble  to  examine  the  situa-tions  "up 
stream"  and  more  particularly in Agriculture,  Trade,  Services 
and Industry. 
AGRICULTURE  .  -
The  flieht  fro~ the  land is continuing at a  speedier 
pace which  may  be  observed  i·n  all the  industrial countries. 
The  Common  Market,  through its price policy, ita structures 
pol~cy and  its regional policy,will influence. this process 
in different ways,  the  negotiations with third cou:ntrj.es  ., 
and  more  particularly with the USA,  will have  reperc~ssiona 
which  should not be  allowed  to call in.to  question  the  very 
1rinciplea of ·the  common  agricultural policy. 
This  development,  whose  direction needs  to be  pin-Gin 
>ointed, will pose  a  number  of questions for persons working 
Ln  ag.ricul  ture. 2 
~hat will  be  the  fate  of  those  who  remain  in  a  recons-
tituted and  restructured agriculture  - assuming  moreover 
that the  structural reforms  are  not  too late,  in which  case 
exodus  from  the  land would  affect the  youngest  elements  of 
the  rural population  and  thus render  inevitable  a  decline  of 
acriculture which would  no  longer  be  only  quantitative,  but 
also  qua~itative, and  therefore  irreversible. 
Those  who  remain  on  the  land  must  not  continue  to  be 
under-educated,  either from  the  general  point  of  view~ or 
from  thG  occupational  angle,  8S  this is still too  often  the 
case~ 
Those  who  will  have  to leave  the  land will  go  throueh 
a  triple mutation  :  they Yvill  te  torn  away  from  their social 
ervironment, will have  to  find  their feet  in urban  centres, 
and will have  to  learn new  skills and  acquire  new  qualifica-
tic1:s8  ~v-crything must  be  done  so  that 1hose  who  come  fro'Jl 
the  land  do  not finish as unskilled workers  in industry, 
without  any  hope  of bettering  the~selves because  they lack 
any  solid, general  train:!.ng. 
The  pace  at which  people  are  leaving agriculture  brings 
up  the  question  of whether  the  creation of  jobs in  the  other 
sectors of activity will keep  pace  with quantitative needs 
and whether  the  means  of adaptation will make  it posGible  to 
ensure  the  necessary correlation between  job  offers  and  demand. 
If it is assumed  that this will not  be  the  case, it is 
reas0nable  to  ask whether it ¥<'ould  not  be  a  good  thing,  for 
evident  social motivest  to  slow  down  the  exodus. 
In  any  case,  the  social measures,  in  the  event  of 
r.;conversj_on  operation  acv-oca ted  elsewhere,  will have  to  be 
applied  to  this  important  sector of activity.  II ere,  tuo, 
the  Community will  be  judged a0cording  to  its capacity  to 
ensur-e  that  the  large  .. -scale  mutations  of human  life occur 
without  social  and  hu~an suffering,  and  that  they  could  even 
offer an  opportunity  to protect human  beings  and  provoke 
thei~ advancement. 3 
TRADE  AND  SE.RVIC!§. 
It would  seem  that hitherto new  jobs are  mainly created 
in this tttertiary"  sector in whj.ch  agricul  tv.ralists are re-
employed.  But  this "tertiary" sector is a  conglom11eratio-n  of 
trades and  various professions whose  economic  and  social 
utility varies widely. We  often find  ourselves  in  the  presence 
either of highly technical  jobs,  or of .jobs which  can  be  put 
on  the  same  footing as  those  of an unskilled workmRn. 
This  amounts  to  saying that a  realistic  app~oach dGpends 
on  closer knowledge  of  the  qualifications which  make  it 
posoible  to distinguish  the  value  0f the  jobs  cre&ted. 
INDUSTRY 
This  problem is at the heart of the  debate.  First of all, 
1 t  is true to  say  that the  development  of  the  "tert-iary  a  sec-
tor would  be  fragile  and  hazardous if the  industrial sector 
does not develop. 
It can  be  said equally clearly that industrialization is 
a  ~!~.eans  in the  service  of objectives. 
Among  these  objectives we  may  quote  :  the  creation of 
jobs, which is an  overriding necessity because  of the  exodus 
from  the  land,  collective redundancies  following  structural 
reforms  of all kinds  in all sectors of activity, young  people 
in  search  of their first  jobs, etc •••• 
It should be  noted  that  produc.tive  investment  does net 
always  correspond  to  the  creation of  jobs  once it is applied 
to structural r_eforms.  which,  in their ini:tial stage at least, 
lead to n:an.power  being made  redundant. 
It is sufficient to note  that productivity, which  io not 
a  bad  thing in itself,  oftGn· exists side  by  side  vJ.i th an 
aggravation  of unemploy;.uen-t,at  least in an initial per.io<.l. 4 
Industrial  development  is necessary  for  har~onizcd 
regional  fevelopment.  The  latter has  no  chance  of  succeeding, 
except  in  periods when  business is booming,  on  condition  of 
course  that  the  Community  is capable  by  acts of will  of 
spreading  the  ex~ansion over  the  whole  of its territory. 
Unfortunately,  we  have  not got  to  this  stage,  and it 
would  really  seem  that regional  co~cerns appear  only in 
declarations  of intent,  but not  in  the Conmunity  policies. 
The  acquisition  of new  advantages for workers  through 
the  intermediary  of laws  and  collective bargaining agreements 
obviously  dep9nds  on  a  high  state  of economic  development, 
and  this more  particularly in  the  industrial sector. 
Attention  should also be  drawn  to  the  factfuat excessive 
disparities  in industrial  develop~ent between Comounity 
countries,  create difficult probleos at the  frontiers,  which 
are  a  source  of speciallJr worrying  :l  .• abolances  .. 
All  industrial  develop~ent must  further be  based  on  a 
satisfactory balance with collective  and  social facilities. 
unfortunately this is not  always  the  case.  However,  social 
equil  i.brium  and  regional  development  in  particula.:- de'Pend  on 
this balance. 
It also happens  too  often  that  the  States,  in  the  frame-
work  cf the).r national  plan,  their  p~ogramme or their forecastsi 
put  in hand  research  on  th8  overall rate  of expansion  to  be 
achieved  and  the  general  means  of attaining it, particularly 
in  the  medium-term,  whereas  at  the  very  same  tioe  this rate 
i tsel:f is at  the  mercy  of increasingly numerous  ex·ccrnal 
hazards.  At  the  Game  time,  if there  are  figures,  we  note 
the  absence,  not  of an  in~ustrial policy,  but  of industrial 
pclicie;.:;~ 5 
Why  should  industrial policies be  defined ?  It is obvious 
t~at occupational branches are  subject to  an  accelerated 
process  of creation,  development,  stagnation and  decline  for 
multiple  reasons.  There  would  be  no  point,  therefore,  in 
establishing inter-professional averages which  did not corres-
pond  to concrete  professional realities. 
This is why  it is indispensable  that  the  evolution of the 
different professional branches  should be  observed  and  known 
in  such  a  way  that the  problems  - and  more  particularly the 
social  problems -may be  measured.  Here,  again, what will be 
the  fate  of  those  who  remain  and  of  those  who  leave  ?  Th~ 
quantitative  and  qualitative  employment  problems  must  al~e 
be  deduced  from  this. 
It is not possible  to choose  a  high rate  of industrial 
expal''1Sion  if the  consequences  for  employment  are left out  of 
account.  If the  rate  chosen is too high, 'it would  lead  the 
public authorities to be  over hasty with reconversion,  mutations 
and  cbanees,  and would facilitate  industrial  and  geographical 
concentration for  purposes  of economic  efficacity  and not for 
soe;ial  ends·. 
Finally,  an  end  must  be  made  to this debate  between  the 
actual choice  of a  rate  of expansion  and  a  quality of life, 
whether at individual or  collecti~e level. 
In truth,  the  two  must  be  closely linked. fuoreover, 
militant  trade  unionists,  theoselves, were  demanding  only  a 
while  ago  that the  coordination of material resources  should 
enable  us  to  attain the highest possible· rates of  ex:) an.:· ion, 
and  this  so  that qualitative  objectives may  be  more  easily 
achieved 1fithin the  shortest- time  limitse 
The  quality of life in all its forms  must  be  an  objective 
and  the  rate  of expansion  a  means  of reaching it. 6 
~oreover, it is difficult  to  see  how  qualitative  objectives 
would  be  compatible  with  a  situation of  low  or  even  stagnating 
economic  pro3ress. 
Of  course,  the  whole  probleQ  of  the  distribution  of  the 
fruits  of expansion  between  the  different requirements  arisen,: 
consumption,  collective facilities  and  productive  investments. 
It goes without  saying  that  the  qualitative  objectives,  in 
addition  to  their traditional aspects,  today  also  comprise  the 
struggle  against pollution  nnd  nuisances,  it being noted, 
hov:ever  ~  that  these  do  not all ori{:;ina te  from  industrial 
development. 
It must  be  added  that  expansion  does  not  only  pose  the 
question  of  the  distribution  of its fruits,  but also that of 
contributions  to  the  financing  of developnent.  By  tax  policies 
to  furthe~ more  or lees forced  saving and  self-financing,  the 
wage-ecrni~g body  or wider bodies  are  called upon  to  supply 
the  first 8apital for  start up  or restart. It is therefore 
quite  legitimate  to  put  the  question  of  the  sharing of  the 
burden,  of how  fair it is  a~d of its results. 
ACCEL}~,RATIOl\  OF  RECOr~VERSION  OrERATIONt~. C_TIA1·1GES  AND  MU1'AJ:IO~N  S 
~...._..~......_.~  .... ~  ... .,.,.--..--- -- -
At  present,  reconversion  operations  are  of different 
dimension3  than  formally. 
Not  so  long  aeo  they  ecnerally affected  one  more  or loss 
important enterprise.  Today  whole  bran:hcs  are  threatened  : 
coal,  textiles, mineral  ores,  etc~. Furthe:more  these  branches 
exist  sid.e  by  side  in  the  saoe  reg:i.on,  Y.rhich  i.::eans  tho. t  re-
conversions  have  come  to  be  occupational,  intcr-occupntione.l 
and  regiono.l. 
Is there  any  need  to  add  that  the  frontier regions  of  the 
Community  are  concJrned  ? 7 
The  extension  of these  operations also poses political 
problems  as  soon  as,  in one  and  the  same  country,  regions  of 
old industrialization, which  are  therefore declining,  are 
juxtaposed with  other which,  being of more  recent  devel0pment, 
have  the  best adapted,  most  progr~ssive and  most  highly 
qualified  iLdustries. 
There  is no  blinking at the  fact that the European 
Coao·_uni ty has not  attached enough  importance  to  rectonal 
development~  The  EEC  ~reaty, although  imperfect,  has  ma~e 
it possible  - by  extensive  interpretat1.on  - to apply policies 
on  reconversion,  regional  investments  and  subsidized housing, 
among  others.  However,  the Treaty of Pari.s is lini  ted  to  two 
branches albeit important  ones. 
Doubtless,  the Ccmmunity  has worked  on  analyzing regional 
problems  by means  of  the  opinions  and  rcporta  of the European 
Economic  and  Social Committee.  Guideli.nes  have  been laid down 
and  yery partial measures are  envisaged,  but all this can.not 
be  enough.  \vhat  is lacking,  here  again,  is will and  resources. 
In any  case  the  Comm.uni ty cannot allow  he  illusion to 
gro\'i  up  that  industria-l decentralization will be  the  effect 
of a  natural evolution.  On  the  contrary, natural development 
is in  the  other direction.  The  ag5ravated  disparities  observed 
at present eore  than  prove  this. Here  again, it will be  one 
of the  essential tests of the Community  will that it assigns 
social and  human  ends  t·o  deve:!.opment. 
Rll?IDITY  OF  T~  LVOLUTJO:N  OF'  SCIENCh  .Al\JD  ~OBN~!.OC·Y 
~  .... - ...........  -~  ~  .........  N~..-·~  ..  ......, 
This  evolution is both  an  element  of regression  and 
advance  on  the  social scale. 8 
There  is regression  as  soon  as it leads  to maladjustment, 
either because  the  persons  conc3rned  do  not  possess  any  basic 
training,  or becausa  the  break  between  the  old and new  manu-
facturing processes  leads  to  chronic  maladjustment,  so  that 
these  persons are left by  the wayside  as  society progresses. 
AdvanceQent will not  be  a  gift. It will not  be  possible 
in all cases,  but  the  great point at stake  is hor;  to profit 
fully  from  changes  and mutations  in  such  a  way  as  to  improve 
the  lot of human  beings.  This will  presuppose  a  complete 
process  - to which  we  will return  - of general  training, 
technical training,  occupational  training and further  training. 
But qualitative  and  quantitative  increase  and  improveir.ent 
of training,  by  Giving  equality of  opportunities  to  everyone, 
will still allow  a  hiatus  to exist between  qualifications 
acquired  and  jobs held. 
CONGLNTilATED  POWERS  M!D  DILU~D J?Oi.J~RS 
~  ............ ~-.. ~~  -n_  .. _.._..._._,......., 
Cencentration is a  general  phenomenon  which  is intarnal 
to  each  of  the  Community  countries, within  the  Community 
itself and  willed by it, particularly in  the  form  of  tbe 
creation of European limited  companies  or  of groupings  of 
firms with  a  view  to cooperation.  The  multinational  companies 
make  their presence felt  on  a  vaster geographical  scale. 
Although  concentration  as  a  technical  means  of attaining 
certain deliberate  objectives cannot  be  called into question, 
- it devel0ps  moreover under all regir.1es  - the  questj on  r;,_c.y  be 
as~ed whether  the  State  and  the  Como~nity itself have  the 
pcwers  to offset ihe  strategy of  these  firmso  This  is why, 
moreover,  the  quarrel for  or against  supranationality  today 
appears  very  much  overtaken  by  events.  There  already exists, 
and  there will cxjst even  more  in  the  coming years,  a 
supranationality of business.  What will  be  the  offsetting 
powers  ? 9 
what will be  the  degree  of responsibility of the 
directors of establishments  ?  ~ill it really be  possible 
to begin a  dialogue  to harmonize  and  evelo.p  collective 
bargaining agreements  and  to ensure  social protection and 
guarantee  security of employment  ? 
ihat will be  the  behaviour of the  parent enterprise 
which is in a  poai  tion  •  as regards  the  siting of fiz·ma,  to 
play as  on  a  chessboard  ? 
These  facts,  these fears,  or these  questions  show  quite 
clearly that the watered-down  powers  of the  St&tes do  r.ot 
correspond to  the factual situation of concentrated powe:s. 
Tis is another way  of saying how  necessary it is to creatd 
a  Com~unit endowed  with political pcwers  of its  ow~. 
IMBALANCES  'WHICH  REAPPEAR  I!'fOESSAN~_E 
It has  to be  recognized that all growth,  par·t:tcularly 
industrial growth,  is the  source  of  imbalances which  are 
incessantly renewed  and  are  due  to  the  speedier pace  of 
chenge.  Adaptation in the wide  sense  of the  term  beco~es 
a  permanent  phenomenon. 
But what is unfortunately,  and  too often,  perceived 
inadequately is that imbalances  from  outside  add  their 
effect to internal imbalances. 
The  monetary crisis of 15  Augu.st  1971,  the  openj. ng 
of frontiers between Common  Market cucrencies - which 
presupposes reciprocal adjustments  - the  tariff negotiations 
between  the  Common  ~arket and  the  non-member  countries,  the 
privileged relations with the  developing countries, which 
will have  to be  expressed in forma  going beyond  traditional 
trade,  - solidarity and  associations  - are  so  ~any elements 
whose  influence we  undergo,  which  we  accept or desire  and 
whiob  are  sources of imbalances. 10 
THE  DE  FA0TO  II\ T
1~RN  AT ION AI,  LIVISIOl.!  OF  LA.DOUR 
------------------~~~-~~~~~~~ 
Industrialization involves  the  risk of  fin~lly creatine 
geographical divisions,  even  wi~hin the  Community,  between 
labour-intensive  industries  and  those  which  make  use  of 
much  capital and  a  wealth of ~chniques.  This  situation 
cnntinucs  and  even  beco~es ag.ravated  ~hen it is a  matter 
of  the  developing  countric~~ 
In this way  a  ,£.e_fa'J!_g  division of labour grows  up 
between regions  or between countries,  which  must  be  corrected 
as  quickly  as possible. 
The  maintenance,  to  say nothing of the  perpetuation,  of 
such  a  situation would  eneender m{jlstice  and  revel t. 
POSITION  OF  THE  WORKEE  IN 
1I'HIS  ~LTTING 
...._...,_,~  .... ..,....  .......... ,  .... ~  . 
There  can  be  no  doubt  ti.Jat  national legislation and 
collective bargainine  agre~ments are  far  from  perfect,  but 
the  trade  union  organizations which  are  the  natural mnnda-
torieG  of  the  workers  pcssBss  at national level  poasibil:l.tbs 
of direct action which  they  do  not  always  have  at Community 
level. 
As  regards enterprises, their dicensions  (volume  and 
geography)  make  collectlvc  concertations  o.nd  conventions 
mere  difficult. 
The  centres  of decision  recede  from  the  human  being, 
dehumanize  rolat:tons  even  more  and  give  rise  to  doubt  as  to 
the  po~sibility and  efficacity of  any  dialogue. 
The  rights exercised by  the  workers  appenr  to  be  more 
limited. 
In this way,  in  ~urop~an limited compagnies,  un 
certainty reigns  as  to  the  representation  of the workers 
and  the  real rights whtch will be  exercised. 
Thus,the  new  dimension  of  the  problems  is not  accompanied 
by  a  new  dimension as  regards  the rights exercised by  the 
workers  and  their organizations,  either in  the  Community,  or 
in the  new  enterprises created or in the  course  of creation. 11 
Social policy in all 1 ts aspects has  n.o  Community:.  rules 
and  too  often remains at the  stage  of coordj.nation of 
national policies. 
11 - WHERE  DOES  THE  COMMUNITY  STAND  TODAY  ? 
The  European Community,  which is in the  process  of 
enlargement,  has not yet become  sufficently strong.  The 
common  p~licies laid down  are not  implemented, with  the 
Axception  of agricultu-ral policy, which is  j_n  danger  of 
being called into question in the  tariff negotiations 
with the  non-member  couzJ.tries. 
This situation poses  special problems  at the  time  when 
four new  members  are  adhering. 
Does  this mean  that the Community  has  done  nothing of 
value  ?  The  establishment  of a  common  market,  the  openin~ 
of the  frontiers have  triggered off an  overall increase  in 
prosperity,_ and  the  development  of  investment and  obliged 
enterprises to adapt  themselves  to  the  general movement  of 
economic  expansion.  But this  development has been  accompanied 
by  imbalances  of which it may  be  said that they boil down 
in essence  to  the  following  : 
- Imbalances  in  incomes  ; 
- Regional  imbalances  ; 
- Imbalances  in employment  ; 
- Monetary  imbalances  ; 
Imbalances  in economic  and  social policies which make 
it difficult to  follow  the  path  towards  economic  and 
monetary union  ; 
- Imbalances  provoked  by  structural changes,  in particular 
reconversion  and  concentrations  ; 
- Imbalances  between  the  vaunted  intention of preserving 
competition  and  the  actual situation whj_cb,  through 
understandings  and  dominant  positions,  is leading to 
enterprises  or professions being in a  position to 
proolaim their own  ·rules  , 12 
Imbalances  due  to  the  difficulty of ensuring fair 
distribution between  productive  investment,  collective 
facilities and  consumption  ; 
- Imbalances  due  to  the  fact  that  the  rules of competition 
are  increasingly having  the  effects of  slowing  down  in 
each  of  the  countries  the  evolution of social progress, 
whereas  no  attempt is made  to research non-wage  produc-
tion costs which it is in  the  joint interest to  ~educe 
in order  to facilitate  the  growth  of productivity  ; 
- Imbalances  brought  about  by  the  inability of the  authorities 
to  throttle  down  inflation,  othe~Nise than by  proposing 
classical methods  which  are  today  recognized  as harmful  : 
putting the  brake  on  wages,  leading  to  unemployed 
production capacity,  accompanied  by  overgeneral credit 
restrictions,  this whole  process  leading to  regression 
and  recession,  whose  duration it is always  impossible 
to  foresee 
.Imbalances  in European  programming,  which is confined to 
recommendations  or even  to  proposals  in which  the  concern 
for  balanced  expansion  seems  to  cover up  trends leading 
t8  the  acceptance  of a  certain amount  of underemployment. 
The  economy  of  each of the  countries is  juxtaposed with 
those  of  the  others, without  any  clear expression  of the 
absolute  need  for  interaction in law and  in facto  In 
many  cases,  Community  policies,  although  they are  the 
subject  of definitions,  guidelines  and  declarations  of 
intent,  are  not  endowed  with  the  resources necessary  to 
implement  them  and  the  institutions capable  of applying 
them  in the  Community  interGst. 
It is true  that disequilibria are  the  common  lot of 
any  society which  is  on  the  road  towards  expansion  or 
confronted  by  external forces,  but in its present state 
the  Community  has  no  policy of reaction  to  events,  nor 
any will to  intervene  in  a  permanent  struggle  against 
ever-emerging disequilibria and  the  in ustices which 
they  involve. 13 
This is the  importan~ fact.  The  practice  of laisser 
faire,  of letting things  go  their  own  way  appears  to 
dominate  evan if it is true  that praiseworthy declarations 
of intent accord a  certain importance  to  these  problems. 
Does  this mean  that the militant trade unionist,  who 
has believed in Euro.pe  from  the  outset,  that is to  say, 
long before it took  concrete  shape  in the Treaties,  is 
overcome  by  discouragement,  or even  by  renunciation, 
No  l  For  the  essence  of the European edifice resices in 
its basic capacity, which  derives  from  its very existence, 
to preserve £reedom  and  ensure  peace. 
The  arrival of four countries with tried and  tested 
democratic  institutions lends strength to  the  six others 
where  libeTty is concerned.  In a  tortured world in which 
conflicts are numerous  and  in which here  and  there bellicose 
nationalism is again raising its head,  it is decisive  that 
ten countries  should  constitute  a  large-scale whole,  capable, 
if it is endowed  with poli  t·ical will,  of being an  essential 
factor in the  defence  of human  freedoms. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that peace will result from  the 
cooperation and  then  the  integration of countries which  a 
short while  ago  were  belligerents and  of which  several have 
met  on  the  field of battle three  times  in a  century. 
This means  that we  must not condemn  the  present trend, 
but that it is indispensable  to  remodel  resolutely and  even 
to transform  and  design what  a  more  human,  more  just and 
more  fraternal society should be. 
All this  so  that the  peoples  of the Community  may  live 
more  happily, but also because ,  if they  st·and  together, 
they  can  show  that their novel  edifice  may  serve  as  an 
example  for  the rest of the world. 
And  this example  will be  reflected more  particularly 
in the  relations w·i th the  developing countries,  and  in the 14 
. 
will to  struggle  toBether against all disparities  and all 
injustice,  in  such  a  way  that  the  young  people  of  the 
industrialized countries  may  not live  in comfort,  boredom 
and  confusion,  whereas  their opposite  numbers  in  the 
developing  couLtries  suffer the  pangs  of hunger,  the  curse 
of illiteracy and  the  refusal  of human  dignity.  There  is 
room  here  to recreate  an  ideal  of cooperation and  solidarity 
in which  the  fresh  forces  of south would  have  plenty  of 
occasion  to  deploy  themselves. 
At  this point, it may  be  thought  that these  considerations 
are wandering  from  the  subject.  Wo  think  that this is not  the 
case at all.  The  title is also  "Society".  lY~oreovcr it would 
not be  conceivable  that,  in connection with  the 
indust·rialization of the  Community,  thf'.t  is to  say its 
expansion  and  growth,  we  would  not  question ourselves as 
regards  the  aims  of  such  expansion  and  growth.  For 
industrialization is not  an  end  in itself. It can  be  a  means 
in the  service  of great objectives,  but we  have  to  grasp  the 
fact that things will not happen  of their  own  volition. 
Natural  evolution,  laisser faire, let things  slide,  and 
growth  for egotistical  ~easons arG  so  many  obstacles which 
must  be  overcome  if Man  is to  be  protected,  promoted,  his 
liberties and  dignity preserved,  with  the  assurance  that 
his efforts,  added  to  those  of others, will create  solidarity 
and  cooperation  - in  one  word,  will establish  peace~ 
Rather  than  defining  a  society in constant evolution, 
always  needing reform  and  always  secreting inequalities, 
injustices,  infringements  of freedom  and  dignity,  it would 
be  better to  see  how  this European  society,  which  we  know, 
may  transform itself by  profiting to  the  maximum  from  the 
moans  which it derives  from  the  expansion  and  progress  of 
science  and  techniques,  on  condition  that  the will exists 
to  do  this. 
All  theoe  points will be  tho  subject  of  the  second 
part. 15 
I  - INDUSTRIAL  POLICY 
Vie  have  se.en  that industri.al policy can  accentuate 
imbalances.  This is why,  although its necessity cannot 
be  called into question as regards  the  increase  in 
incomes,  employment  and  re-employment  of workers,  it 
is indispensible  that the European Economic  Community 
should assign to this policy the  role  of an  instrument 
in the  service  of social and  human  objectives. 
These  objectives will not be  achieved by  the  n~tal 
evolution of  things. It is even possible  to  move  away 
from  them  in the  absence  of a  definition of  Co~munity 
eriantations and resources fitting into a  body  of 
policies which ·themselves  are  fully Community. 
It is these  policies which we  are  going  to endeavour 
to describe, it being understood  that,  on  the  basis  of 
the  ideas put forth, later studies will make  it possible 
to pinpoint  the  concrete measures which will have  to 
be  taken. 
THE  FINAL  OBJECTIVES  OF  INDUSTRIAL  DEVELOPMENT 
In a  Community  enlarged to  ten countries,  the  first 
concern must  be  to  apply  a  regional policy,  often 
defined in the  Community  institutions but in the  majority 
of cases lacking means  for its implementation. 
Regional  development  is conditioned not  only by 
industrial development,  but by  the  provision of 
collective  and  social equipment  in the widest  sense 
of  the  term,  that is to  say not  only what  directly 
interests the  industrialists, but also  those facilities 
which condition  the  type  and  setting of life. 
The  financial requirements will be  considerable, 
but it will also be  necessary to  be  in  a  position to 
dispose  of real estate, which  today is the  subject of 
inadmissable  speculation. It would  be  vain  to  endeavour 
to plan  the  use  of the  available territory if private 
interests were  to  oppose  the  ownership  of land by  the 
collectivity. 16 
Town  and  country planning,  more  particularly as 
regards  transport, which provides  the  means  of irrigating 
the  Community's  territory,  must  be  actively pursued, 
unless  the  decline  of the  peripheral regions is to become 
worse. 
Moreover,  regional  imbalances would  make  the  achieve-
ment  of economic  and  monetary union  extremely difficult. 
Transport is also extremely  important inside  the 
towns,  when  we  observe  that the  urbanization process 
often leads  to  the  congestion  of certain built-up areas. 
Regional  policy must result in diversification and 
spread  of economic  development.  In the  present state  of 
affairs, where will is lacking,  where  the  proposed 
approaches  are  insuffici~nt and  where  the  measures 
envisaged  and  not yet applied are still too  much  on  a 
partial scale,  the  Community  runs  the risk of promising 
industrial decentralization, whereas,  in fact,  economic 
development  is increasingly going  on  through concentration. 
AN  ACTIVE  EN~LOYWffiNT POLICY  --·-----·-------
The  Standing Committee  on  Employment  should  be  a  good 
instrument  through which it will be  possible  to propose 
solutions  to quantitative  and  qualitative  employment 
problems. 
Faced with  the  great movement  of  change  and  mutation, 
-reconversion,  concentration,  structural  reforms~ headlong 
progress  of science  and  technology,  accentuated  impact 
of external events,  evolution  of  occupational sectors, 
often growing  inadaptation of  those  leaking for work  to 
the  jobs being offered  - any policy must  be  based  on 
forecasts  and  updated  to  meet  quantitative  and  qualitative 
changes.  Such  a  policy must  have  available  instruments  of 
adaptation  and  or general  advancement,  both technological 
and  occupational. 17 
It wuat  be  based on  objective  information concerning 
the  trend  of education and  professions. 
Furthermore,  we  have  seen that any  development 
policy accentuates  the  disequilibria between  industrial 
sectors.  ~hie is why  an  industrial policy cannot  throw 
ita net too wide. It is advisable  to make  more  detailed 
analysie within occupational. branches  ,i~.:.JD.any cases, in 
view  of the .change  in pace,  industry will be  decliniug 
and it will be  advisable,  therefore,  to define,  in 
particular by agreements,  the  fate  of those who  in any 
case !ill remain in these  declining branches  and  of those 
whoi£e  tad  ~o~lea7e:in saarcm  of·  othe~ activities. This 
posos,  inter alia, the  following problems  :  remuneration, 
readaptation, working conditions, regional  investments, 
subsidized housing, adaptation to  a  new  setting of life, 
etc  ••• 
~o all this should be  added that an  active  employment 
policy will have  to help those which  economic  development 
throws  on  the  scrap heap,  that is to  say,  elderly persona 
and  persons ill adapted or unadaptable  to nex  forms  of 
production  and  for whom  social measures will have  to be 
envisaged,  in particular retirement before normal  age. 
An  overaJl  bal~,ce sheet of what  the Community  has 
done  in the  matter of employment  wi.ll need  to be  drawn 
up  in such  a  way  that the deficiencies in this policy 
having been brought to light, it will be  possible  to 
remedy  them. 
In any  case,  the principle must  be laid down  that 
it would  not be  admissibl~ that the  general prosperity 
of the Community  should be  acquired at the price of 
imbalances  in employment  and  even  of unemployment  end 
downgrading  of individuals at the  very  time  when 
qualifications are  progressing. 
In brief,  the  social cost of reconversion must  be 
borne  by  the Community. 
A  TRAINING  POLICY 
This is doubtless  inseparable  from  employment 
policies, but must  go  beyond it once  the  objective 
aimed  at is the  transformation of Society. 18 
The  Community  collectivity must  attach primordial 
importance  to  this problem if it is desired  to  ensure 
equality of opportunity in practice. 
The  child does not  always  receive  at school 
specific  training without which he will becoce 
increasingly incapable  of ensuring participation and 
action within the  collectivity. 
In accordance with his social milieu,  a  child 
cannot  accede  to higher education for lack  of resources, 
a  lack which  moreover  is not offset lY  the  mediocre 
scholarships  awarded. 
Education  and  training must  become  permanent,  both 
for  those  who,  because  of their parents lack  of financial 
resources were  obliged to  abandon  thoir studies  and  for 
those  who,  for physiological  and  charecter reAsons, 
were  not  apt for  study at a  decisive  moment  in their 
scholastic  training. 
It is evident that the  school  and  post-school 
periods must  become  increasingly complementary  and  make 
it possible  in  the  aggregate  to  ensure  the  continuity 
of a  solid,  general  and  occupational  training which  are 
conditions for full  development  of Man  and multiskill 
occupational  training, which  2re  major  problems  in  face 
of  the  mutations  and  changes  going  on. 
Finally,  the  Community,  like  each  of its component 
countries, will have  to  ponder  thG  fact  that it is 
impossible  for  everyone  to  occupy  in  a  society,  of 
whatever  form it be,  jobs which  always  and nocessarlj_ 
correspond  to  their knowledge.  An  yet, Man  must  be 
lifted above  himself,  in particular to  strengtnen:1 
democracy. 
This brings up  the  problem  of  the  full  development 
of Man  in his work,  but also  outside his work,  in his 
family,  in collective life in  the  city,  e·tc ••• 19 
SOCIAL  POLICY 
The  overall prosperity which we  have  emp~aaized 
many  times  goes hand  in hand with intolerable disparities 
which  must  disappear. 
The  accentuation of social pro·gress  comes  up  against 
two  situations on  which  the European Economic  Community 
has not sufficently expressed itself. These  are  : 
a) Competitiveness.  This has become  the key word.  May 
it not be  feared that this will lead· the  Stat.es  to 
apply policies slowing down  social advantages  on  the 
pretext of competition,  a,situation which is 
unacceptable  from  the  social, but also  from  the 
economic  point of view,  because  the  driving force 
behind expansion is a  balance between  the  growth  of 
consumption  and  investment. 
This leads us  to request that the Community  should 
define its policy and  state clearly that economic  and 
social progress  demands  a  progression  of.wages and 
social advantages  and  a  redu.ction  of the  nonwage 
costs due  to  inadequate productivity,  speculation, 
situation incomes,  etc  ••• 
b)  ::Cn:flation. It is true  that this is spreading throughout 
the whole  world,  but  the battle which  must  be  wage~ 
against it cannot be  satisfied with simpliste  and 
dangerous  remedies,  such as  a  slow-do\vn  in remunerations, 
non-utilization of pro·duction capacity,  or  scarce 
development credits. Fortunately,  these  approaches  are 
losing ground.  People  are  aware  today  that the  qauses 
of inflation are .multiple  and  varied  :  the  market, 
lack of  job qualification,  speculation,  situation 
incomes, .protected sectors, deliberate price  p.olicies 
in public  services, agriculture, etc  •••• 20 
EVOLUTION  OF  COLLECTIVE  BARGAINING 
It is quite  evident·~at social policy is harmonization 
in an  upwards  direction of social legislation. It is also 
the  possibility for  trade  union  organizations to negotiate 
collective bargaining agreements  :  (re~uneretions, working 
conditions)  and  to  extend  the  field of catters dealt with 
and  the  geographical area. 
The  role  of the Community  is to facilitate  the 
d~velopment of this policy and  chiefly to supply infor-
mation  and statistics,  and this at a  sufficently decentra-
lized level in each branch for  them  to  be  significant. 
Although it is true  that the  policy of industrialization 
requires valorization of industrial work,  both material and 
moral,  we  are  obliged  to xecognize  that at the  present 
time  this is only  a  pious wish.  This valorization can  only 
come  through  improvement  in working conditions  social 
advantages,  the  length of the working week  and remunerations. 
INCOMES  POLICY 
Incomes  policy,·which has been  a  failure  in several 
c.ountries,  has,  on  certain occasions,  been proposed at 
Community  level.  The  idea behind this policy is a  balance 
between  the  provision of collective  and  social facilities, 
productive  investments  and  consumption.  It should be  noted 
that it often appears  the  residual as far as  the  ~est­
mentioned  item is concerned. 
In reality,  the  obstacles to  an  incomes  policy are 
many  : 
- reduce  consumption. Experience  proves  that this is both 
a  social injustice and  a  handicap  to  expansion. It is 
not  in a  climate  of relative austerity that the  action 
of investing is ac·complished,  if the  internal market 
is  inc~rtain and  the  external market  precarious. 21 
~berefore, a  brake  in consumption and  in investment 
is accumulated,  ·often with long-term effects. Need  one 
observe  that a  brake  in expansion also leads  to a  lack 
in collective and  social equipment. 
Consumption  covers a  disparity of incomes,  some  of 
which  are  checked and  declared by third parties s·imilarly 
limited and affected by  taxation.  The  initial effect of 
an  incomes  policy is, therefore,  to strike  incomes  on  a 
priority basis and to increase  social injustice. 
Both  tho·se  for and  agai.nst  an  incomes  policy must 
~gree that it is first necessary to knew  of the  incomes. 
Quite  a  lot must be  done  in this respect in order to 
exceed the  aggregate level, which,  in any  case,  is often 
without ·practical significance. 
Such more  thorough knowledge  would  help in collective 
negotiations, which still remain  a  decisive  instrument 
of social progress and which make  it possible  to  safeguard 
the  freedom  of the  contracting parties. 
From  the  point of view  of a  better division of incomes, 
need  one  add  that any  action against disparities does  not 
belong to  an  incomes  policy but to  a  redistrivution  policy~ 
to  a  fiscal reform policy,  to ·a  policy of etrctural reform, 
to a  regional  development policy,  etc ••• 
This also applies to direct and  indirect taxation. 
The  growing needs  of the Community  with regard to 
equipment,  infrastructur~,and devalopment  of the 
terri  tory,  as well as  the  need·  to· socialize achievements, 
require that the  increasing tax levies'aggregate  should 
be  fair1y distributed. 22 
It should also be  noted,  as regards  the  financing 
of industrial  development  from  taxation,  that it would 
be  very interesting to know  what  is its .utilization, 
and  the  results acheved. 
THE  DTivlENSIONS  OF  IHDUSTRIAL  SOCl"ETY 
Within  the  Community  understandingsand concentrations 
responding to very  divergent  motives  are  developing. 
Moreover,  the  Community,  for reasons  of greater economic 
efficacity,  is pursuing activities for  the  creation of 
limited companies,  or groupings  of firms,  some  with a 
view  to mergers  and  others with  a  view  to  cooperation 
for certain important butlimited aims.  At  the  same  time, 
multinational  companies  are  developing.  This  new  ,; 
dimension, which  cannot but become  stronger in  the  years 
ahead,  calls for  the  following  remarks  : 
- will not  the  strategy of the  large-scale  enterprises 
be  more  and  more  independent  of the  orientation which 
the  Community  considers desirable  ? 
The  strategy of the  large-scale enterprises  vis-~-vis 
their establishments,  for which it may  be  feared  that 
decentralization will be  confined to management  in 
the  narrow  framework  of imperative  directives. 
- The  stragegy of large-scale  enterprises can  lead to 
the  shifting of establishments for  exclusively 
financial  and  economic  reasons  and  to  the  detriment 
of social considerations. 
- Will  the  strategy of  the  large-scale enterprises  allow 
of any  effective  trade  union action if, at the 
national level,  the  interlocutor representing these 
enterprises  has  no  mandate  to negotiate  and  undertake 
commitments  ? 
- Will  trade  union  representation in these  new  forms  of 
enterprises be  effective,  and will. its rights be 
recognized  and  respected ? 23 
The  above  shows  all the  imp.ortance  which must  be 
i 
at-tached  to  supervision of  understanding~ and  conoen- I. 
trations for which European  laws  are  ve·ry  inadequate 
and  international legislation non-existant. 
SOCIAL  STRAINS 
Apart from  the  external  imbalances already mentioned, 
many  questions arise at enterprise level  : 
The  growing specialization of work,  the  monotony 
it engenders,  the  splitting-up of tasks which leads  to 
repetitive  and non-creative  actions,  the  rhythm  of 
intensity and  continuity of work  appear as particularly 
distressing phenomena. 
Work  on  the  assembly line is today called into 
question. 
The  fact that workers  are  not called upon  to know 
an~ participate in the life of the  enterprise creates 
increased strains. Moreover,  the essential decisions 
are  often  taken  upstrea~ from  the  enterprise, without 
any  internal participation,  even  on  a  consultative level. 
These  questions must  be  dealt with by  the European 
Economic  Community.  France has  just published an  initial 
report which represents  an  approach  to  these  problema  : 
"vera une  organisation plus humaine  du  travail indus-
trial"  (Towards  a  more  human  organization of industrial 
work).  For  the  present,  this is only  an  outline which 
will have  to  be  completed by  other studies. 
Having  said this, Man  can doubtless achieve 
fulfillment  in his work,  but even  more  outside it. 
The  human  being,  tired out by nervous strains, often 
over-crowded transport services, must  be  in a  position 
to rest thanks  to  a  progressive  and  effective reduction 
in the working week.  This priority for  the  reduction 
of the  working week,  over and  above  periods  of rest, 
must  procure ·for the workers  the necessary free  ·time 
for more·  and  more  furthe·r  training,  oul  ture ,  family life  , 24 
thinking and  communal  life. 
THE  NUISANCES  AND  POLLUTIONS.  OF  TIIDUSTRI.AIJ  SOCIETY 
The  French Economic  and  Social Council  and  the 
European Economic  Community  are  concerning themselves 
with problems  of the  environment. 
Need  we  repeat that even  though  speeaier industrial-
ization can  be  a  further cause  of pollution and nuisances, 
it is not  the  only contributing factor to  these. It 
should be  noted  in particular that the  destruction of 
sites is often  the result of real estate promotion 
appetites incited by  extremely profitable  specu~ations. 
This is the  general  problem which  should be  dealt wi~h, 
in particular by  a·n  active  town  and  country planning 
p~licy into which  should be  dovetailed  the  campaign 
against nuisances  and pollutions and for the  preservation 
of nature  and sites. But  this policy will only be  active 
if it is capable  of mastering the  private  int~rests which 
stand in opposition  to  the  co~mon interest. 
As  regards  industry,  the  stress must  be  laid on 
prevention. 
If there  are  charges which weigh  on  production,  there 
can be  no  question of putting them  on  the  same  footing, 
on  the  human  plane, with  the  protection  of health and,  on 
the  :financial plane, whi th  .. the  ~11i'in~  tel.y  gr.aat~r moat  u·f 
repairing  dam~ge omce  it has baen .don~~ 
The  6ommunity  must  therefore  carry  on  vigorous 
international action,  perhaps  through  the  intermediary of 
the United Nations,  so  that all countries  adopt  ~rGventive 
measures. 
~he Community  itself should  give  the  example  by 
adopting legislation to  protect ~an, Nature,  resourses 
and sites. 
The  countries making it up  will have  to  pool  their 
information,  research and  experience. 
The  most  significant cases will need  to  be  researched 
at the level of enterprises and  industrial sectors. 25 
ASSOCIATING  THE  DEVELOPING  OOUNTRIES 
!Che  developing c·ountriea are going through difficulties 
which  arise  : 
- for  some  among  them  from  rapid  populat~on growth  ; 
- from  the  diffculty,  even  in a  sttuation where  the 
.overall income  is ·increasing,  of increasing individual 
incomes  ; 
"""  from  ·the  gr.ow.ing  disparities in income,  compared with 
th~ industrialized countries  ; 
- from  the  fluctuations  of raw  material prices. 
International and Community  aid is therefore ne·ceasary 
in different forms  ..  But it must  be  well realized that  th.is 
aid, whose  detailed pro·cedures will need  to be  re-examined, 
factilitates the  industrialization of  the/se  countries. 
Unfortunately,  this initial industrialization leads to  a 
a  sort of international division of labour, whose  effect 
is to establish segregation between the  industrialized 
c~untries and  the  developing countries.  In the  case  of the 
first it may  be  observed that,  since capital is abundant, 
and  technical training develqped,  they  are  able  to build 
up  growth  industries requiring high qualifications.  On  the 
other hand,  the  developing- countries are  generally oblig_ed 
to limit themselves  to industrialization,  employing  a  large 
percentage  of_manpower,  raw-materials,  or  the  production of 
non-aophiaiticated goods. 
This  internat_,..onal  division of labour cannot be 
satisfactory and  this is why,  although for  the  time-being 
it corresponds  to  a  de  facto  situation, it cannot have  a 
lasting character. Diversification must  come,  In the first 
place,  an  investment effort must be  made  by  insisting that 
the  private capital which is 1nvested should not be  only 
at short term with  the  aim  of acheving often excessive 
profitability,  squeezing the  country and  then repatriating 
the  dividends. 26 
This way  of doing  things constitutes an  indadmissable 
exploitation  of  these  countries. 
But if we  wish  that diversification should be  a 
success,  the  campaign against illiteracy must  be  exten~ed 
~~d the  general  and professional training, without which 
industries  employing qualified manpower will not set up 
in the  developing countries,  must  be  increased. 
At  a  time  when  the  international monetary  systems 
has  to  be  revised, it is indispensible  that the  Com~unity 
should associate  these  countries  in  the  search ftir  solu-
tions,  for  the  problems  of balance  are  vital for all these 
countries, which must  in particular obtain  the  means  of 
financing their development  and  no  longer  be  subject to 
the  fluctuations  of raw materials prices. 
~_JNSTRUMENTS OF  ECONOMIQ_pEVELOPMENT 
a) Public  enterprises 
Europe  finds itself in fact  in a  situation in 
which  the  private  and  cdllective  economic  sectors 
exist side  by  side,  the latter including the  public 
enterprises.  We  c~nnot admit  that the  role  of  these 
snould be  reduced. 
Public  enterprises havo,  in fact,  made  it possible 
to  acneve  results in fields wbich  are not  immediately 
profitable,  to  ensure  public  services and  to boost 
development~ particularly through basic  research,  to 
modify  structures  and  to provide highly  technological 
facilities. 
Too  often in national plans  and European  programming 
nothing is done  to define  a  policy for  this sector, 
despite  the  fact that it constitutes  an  irreplaceable 
instrument  of action. 
b)  The  intervention funds 
Europe  has  certain funds  available  :  the European 
investment Bank,  the  new  Social Fund,  the European 
Agricultural Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund.  But  these 27 
are all inadequately endowed  and  in addition are not 
cobrdinated.  Yet  they  should constitute invaluable 
elements  of overall finan-cial  policy  •.  This is not  the 
casa  and  this is the  reason why 1  as was  demanqed  in 
particular in a  recent report on  regional policy,  these 
instruments, which  are  today dispersed,  should be  a 
financial tool at the  disposal of the Community  for  the 
achievement  of its ·policies. 
c) Plannins 
In an  economy  which will be  increasingly open  to 
the  outside world,  there  should be  research into  the 
ambi tiona  and limits of planning..  Too  often  the word 
planning or programming  covers very  d~fferent realities 
according to  the  countries. 
European planning or programming  should aim  .at  : 
-Ensuring that the economies  of: each Community  country 
are  complementary: and  no  longer~merely juxtaposed. 
This is the  obvious precondition for the  achievement 
of the  economic  and  monetary  union. 
- Introducing Ia  ~ong-term forward  planning on  the 
aevelopmen.t  of the·  C.ommuni ty ·and  endeavouring 
precisely to elaborate  a  model  of oivilimatior..  This 
defined picture  of the  future  seems  to be  auite 
indispensable  t·o  us if every_ citizen of the Community 
ie to have  a  clear vision of the  objectives being 
pursued. 
--Framing medium-term  (five year)  plans which  are 
closer to reality, while  taking account nevertheless 
of the  fact that, with tne  passing  o~ the  years, 
the  medium-term  ob·jective~s .:defined  in a  plan tend to 
become  outdated, because  ot ~h~ •ccel~rated evolutioh~ 
either within or without  the Community,  more 
particularly as regards production and  employment. 28 
- givingto  the  assessment  of the  short-term economic 
situation which,  every six months,  must  pinpoint the 
real trends,  the  possibility of proposing revieiQns, 
reflecting the  real situations as closely as  possible. 
Moreover,  planning cannot be  an  empty  envelope.  It 
must  include  policies  acco~panied by  the  resources 
neqessary to  apply  them.  However,  so  far European 
programming  consists at the  most  of recommendations, 
some  of which being more  concerned with balance  than 
expansion,  have  appeared to be  questionable. 
Of  course  thought will rapidly have  to be  given to 
the  question  of whether Community  planning, which will 
cover a  whole  body  of policies, which  are  an  expression 
of the  general interest, will be  the  master of the field. 
Is it not possible  to  suppose  that planning will be 
breached by  the  divergent internal and  external policies 
of the  Com~unity, worked  out and  applied more  specially 
by concentrations,  particularly in the field of regional 
development. 
CIVILIZATION  AND  INDUSTRIALIZATION  MUST  BE  COMPATIBLE 
It is certain that the free  market  economy  which 
creates -but not always  - riches cannot cope  with the 
qualitative needs  of civilization,  more  particularly : 
- the  protection and  advancement  of human  beings  ; 
- public  service  ; 
- regional  development  and  town  and  country planning  ; 
- the redistribution of incomes  ; 
- the  maintenance  of balances which  are  continually 
called into question. 29 
This is why  a  "liberal" economy  can  obviou.aly ·.not 
lead to  the  achievement  of these  objectives.  The  Community 
policies to be  implemented will have  to constitute means 
of action in the various fields wher.e  it is necesaa~y_, not 
only  to boost quantitative development,  but also to give 
it social and human  objectives. 
THE  CO'IVll41lNITY 'S REAL  POWERS 
The  dilution of powers ·which  remain at national .level 
leads to  : 
- a  weakened  Community  ; 
- difficulty in going ieyond  the definition of Community 
policies-which are  judgee desirable wbil.e,  at he  same 
time,  concentrated de  facto  powers  are building up. 30 
Realization  of these  facts  makes  it imperative  to 
have  an  economic,  social  and  monetary union progressively 
endowed  with  the  powers necessary  to  ensure  its functioning 
and  to arrive within  the  shortest possible  tiffie  at political 
union. 
ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  DEMOCRACY 
The  political democracy which will have  to  be  found 
at the  level  of  the  Community  institutions -Parliament 
and  government  - will not be  sufficie.nt. It must  be 
accompanied  by  economic  and  social  democracy which will 
enable  management  and  labour to  pronounce  on  the  main 
guidelines,  the  outlook for Community  development  and 
the  model  of civilization which will have  to be  created 
day  after day. 
Doubtless  the Economic  and  Social Committee  is a 
centre tor concerted action, but it has  beco~e apparent 
that it needs  to  be  reformed.  This  is the  meaning  of  the 
cu~rent discussion  on  its procedures. 
But  even if it is reformed,  this body will be 
insufficient in itself. 
Consultation between  the  two  sides of industry must 
be  at more  decentralized levels  in order to facilitate, 
among  othe  things,  the  evolution of collective bargaining 
agreements,  whose  field of action must  increase without 
cease,  both  as  regar~s the  subjects dealt with  and  their 
geographical  dimension. 
The  consultation,  on  whatever level it takes place, 
must  be  the  subject of complete  and  digestible  information, 
circulated in  good  time,  in  synthetic  form  and  continually 
updated  in view  of  the  fluid nature  of  economic  and  social 
facts. 
Economic  and  social  de~ocracy cannot  be  satisfied with 
vague  concartation at a  general level, if the  decisions 
taken at the  level  of industrial branches  and  enterprises 
are  purely  a  matter  of the  employers'  willwithout  the 
trade  unions  even being consulted. 31 
If this situation were  to be  perpetuated, it would 
ha~e serious consequences for the  future  of the Community. 
Because  of the  new  dimension  of  ept~rprise~, the centres 
of decision are  increasingly far away  from  the worker, 
who  often can  only bring this influence to bear - very 
imperfectly moreover - on  the  establishment in whic.h  he 
worko  through  the  intermediary of his trade union organiza-
tion. But this establishment itself is often conditioned 
by  a  multinational strategy. Will  the worker  then be  in 
contact with an  interlocutor having real power  to negotiate 
new  collective bargaining contracts,  or to intervene  in the 
management  in one  way  or another ? 
This is why  it would  be  inadmissable  that these  problems 
should not be  dealt with by  the Community. 
The  establishment  of European limited companies  and  the 
creation of groupings of enterprises must not be  motivated 
only by  concerns  of competitivenes,  dynanism,  competition 
and  economic  efficiency. It is the Community's  duty  to  see 
to it that,  among  the  qualitative  objectives,  trade  union 
participation will not be  sacrificed. 
It would be  giving a  curious-model of industrial 
civilization if the role  of the  trade union were  to be 
reduced to that of the Red  Cross  of the Economy,  dealing 
only with the  consequences  - often socially damaging  for 
the workers  - of economic  actions which would  remain  the 
reserved province  of the  States and  the  employers. 
This is one  of the essential acts which  the Community 
must  acco~plish if it wishes  to.prove  that the  civilization 
to be built up  is not, for it, the  mere  quest for material 
achievements. 32 
CONCLUSIONS 
These will be brief. 
The  Cocmunity,  in the  condition of a  market and  a  customs 
union,  aims  at increasing its overall material prosperity by 
greater industrial development. 
But the  pursuit of material objectives  c~ot  be  enough. 
A civilization, built to last, cannot emerge  spontaneously 
from  the multiplication of goode  and  products. 
~he fact  is· that the  overa11 wealth  of the  Oommu~ity and 
the  acceleration of its pac.e  of develo.pment  can accentuate 
imbalances  and  ~njustices. 
A laisaer fa  ire·,  lais·aer· passer a·tti  tude  must  be  condemned. 
The  Community's  duty is clear. 
Intolerable disparities must  be  effectively combatted  : 
those which exist between human  beings as regards  incomes  ; 
those which are worsening between regions;  those wich bring 
up  the  question of war  or peace when,  at the level of the 
planet,  some  people  are  increasingly rich whilst others 
become  poorer and  poorer. 
The  regression of human  beings  on  the  social scale oould 
be  the  consequence  of the  speedier pace  of structural reforms 
and 'reconversion operations, which makee  i"t  imperative for the 
Community,  if it wishes  to be  more  than a  talking shop,  to 
introduce  equality of opportunity by  creating tbe means  for 
constant human  advancement. 
The  setting of life, the  type  of life and  working 
conditione are  perturbed at all levels by  pollutions, nuisances, 
nervous strains,  the  transformation of ~abour, congested 
transport facilities.  Town  and  country planning must  be  one 
of the  primordial testa of the Community will to make  the 
general interest prevail and  to assign social and  human  ends 
to development. Political,  economic  and  social democracy still remains 
to be  established. People's civic rense  could be  gravely  impaired 
if everyone  had  the  feeling that he  was  a  passive  instrument 
in often anonymous  hands. 
By its very existence,  the  enlarged Community  constit~s 
a  decisive  factor for  freedom  and  peace,  but it owes  it to 
itself to become,  through its actions,  an  example  for  those 
making it up  and  for  the  rest of  the  world. 
The  model  of civilization is conditioned by  the will 
of the  peoples  and  the  accomplishment,  day after day,  of 
tasks carried out with  stubborness  and  resolution in the 
framework  of action aimed at placing the Economy  in the 
service  of Man. CONFERENCE 
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VENICE  - 1972 No  revolution in the  course  of history has  so  completely 
transformed  the lives of  so  many  men,  or for so  many  years,  as 
the  Industrial Revolution.  Unlike  political revolutions,  which 
are short,  violent spasms  in the life of nations,  the  Industrial 
Revolution is a  continuing process that involves  the destruction 
of social,  mental  and  institutional equilibriums and  the  construc-
tion of others,  as delicately balanced as  those  that went  before. 
Together with material wealth,  industrialisation has  brought 
insecurity to  the heart of human  societies,  by  making  the  future 
appear  as  no  longer a  repetition of the past,  and  frustration, 
by  creating needs  at a  ~ar higher rate than it could satisfy 
them. 
Growth is thus  only at first sight an ecoftomic  process. 
It is measured  and  expressed in economic  terms,  that is in terms 
of production,  consumption and  trade.  But it is an optical illu-
sion to  believe that politics are  giving way  to  economics,  merely 
because  governments  now  spend  most  of  their time  deciding about 
interest rates,  price  controls  and  the  incidence  of  taxation, 
settling labour disputes  or encouraging industrial concentrations. 
In fact,  by  doing all this,  they are  influencing the objectives 
of society and  the  relationship between social forces.  In other 
words,  they are  taking political action.  Relationships  between 
economics  and politics,  between material infrastructure and 
ideology,  are  ideological relationships whose  direction may  alter. 
The  will to  power,  aggressiveness,  the  embodiment  of ideologies 
once  expressing themselves  in wars  or revolutions  (and still, to 
some  extent,  doing so  today)  have  found  a  new  home  in economic 
debate.  In our  day,  Spartacus  would  be  a  trade  union leader, 
Wellington would  be  President of Shell,  Bonaparte  would  be 
Commissioner-General  for  Planning and  Charlemagne  would  preside 
over  the  European Commission. 2 
Current  debates  on the real  nature  and  the  prospects  of 
.economic  growth are  essentially political.  Jan Tinbergen holds 
the  Nobel  Prize  for  Economics,  but  he  is taking political action 
when  he  proposes  to  replace  the  concept  of  "Gross  National  Pro-
duct"  by  that  of  "Gross  National Happiness".  Sicco  Mansholt  is 
President  of  the  Commission of  the  European Communities,  but  he 
is acting politically  (and  incidentally he  makes  no  bones  about 
it) when  he  puts  forward,  instead of  the  GNP,  the  concept  of 
"gross  national utility".  The  experts  of  the  "Club of  Rome"  are 
taking political action,  even if it is only  by  producing  figures 
out  of  a  computer  as  others  might  produce  rabbits out  of  a  hat, 
when  they  forecast  that  growth will  come  to  an end  in 2020.  The 
great debates  of our  time  are  stated in economic  terms,  but  their 
basic nature  remains  political  : 
- Is  the  organisational system,  best suited to  produce  and 
distribute wealth,  of  a  capitalist or  of  a  socialist type  ? 
- Is  economic  growth,  as  we  understand it today,  an  advaaced 
form  of  mass  hysteria,  leading the  world  to disaster  ? 
- In what  ways  can industrialized countries express  the  under-
lying interdependence  of  mankind  as  a  whole,  by  contributing 
to  the  development  of  the  Third  World  ? 
- Why  does  Europe  want  to  assume  an  economic  individuality that 
will set her  apart  from  the United States  ?. 3 
The  object of  this report is to  bring out, starting 
from  aneconomic  analysis,  the  social and political nature  of 
the  phenomenon of growth as  we  experience it in the  indus-
trialised countries,  and particularly in Europe.  We  shall 
consider in turn  : 
A.  The  origins of  growth,  bringing out  the  non-quanti-
tative factors in the  increase of production; 
B.  The  consequences  of growth which are  not  only  the 
proliferation of  available  goods  but  also  the  prolife~ation of 
social stresses and  conflicts;  we  shall consider the  new  forms 
of  confrontation which  have  been  emerging  over  the  past  few 
years; 
c.  Finally we  shall ask questions,  in the  light of the 
foregoing analyses,  about  the  future  of growth  and  the  role of 
social forces  and political institutions,  including the  Euro-
pean institutions,  in this future. 
X 
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A - THE  ORIGINS  OF  GROWTH 
From  the  end  of the  19th Century  to  the  1929 crisis, 
annual  growth rates  for  per  capita output,  in the  main industrial 
nations,  ranged  from  0.5%  (Britain)  to  2.1%  (United States),  the 
rates in Continental European countries  (France,  Germany,  Italy) 
being very  close  together at about  1.4%.  If we  skip over  the 
economic  crisis of  the  Thirties  and  the  1939-1945 war,  we  shall 
find  a  very rapid acceleration in the  current  period  (1949-1963), 
since  per  capita.  output  has  grown,  in these  same  countries,  at 
rates  going  from  2.1%  (Britain again)  to  6.1%  (Germany).  All  in 
all,  the  tempo  of  growth has  more  than doubled. 
If we  confine  the  scope  of our  investigation to  the  post-
war  period alone,  growth has  been spectacular in Europe,  not  only 
in its already industrialized western part  (most  of whose  coun-
tries will  come  together in the  new  European  Community  of  Ten), 
but  also in its less-developed southern part  (Spain,  Greece, 
Portugal,  Yugoslavia,  Turkey)  and  in its eastern part,  organised 
on  the  basis  of  socialist economies.  In its 1972  Report  the 
United Nations  Economic  Commission  for  Europe  shows  that  Europe 
as  a  whole,  which  aocounted in 1950 for  39%  of  the  world's  in-
dustrial output,  as  against  45%  for  the  United States,  was  res-
ponsible in 1969 for  48%,  as  against  33%  for  the  United States. 
To  analyse  growth  factors  since  the  last war,  we  have  two 
major  studies  :  that  by  Denison  and  Poullier for  the  main  indus-
trialized countries  of  the  West  (l),  and  that  by  Malinvaud,  Carre 
and  Dubois  for  France  (2). 
(1)  Why  Growth Rates  Differ. The  Brookings  Institution 
(2)  La  croissance  frangaise  aux Editions  du  Seuil I 
.s 
Both stress the  importance  of  qualitative factors  in 
economic  development. 
The  study  by  Denison and  Poulier  covers  the  1955-1962 
period,  with special attention to  the United States, France, 
Germany,  Italy and  Britaino  Its method  consists in identifying 
the  main factors  of  growth,  in assessing the  progress of  each 
during  the  period  under  consideration and  finally in weighting 
this progresi in accordance  with the  proportion of  the  income 
of each factor  to  national income  as  a  whole,  so  as  to establish 
the  contribution of  each  to  national growth. 
Now  if we  consider  the  great traditional factors  of pro-
duction,  namely  labour  and  capital,  we  shall see  that  they  by 
no  means  account  for  the  size  of  growth during this period.  And 
this is true  even if one  brings  in qualitative  elements  such as 
the  higher qualifications of  the  work  force.  Here  in fact is the 
share  of  these  two  factors  in the  growth  of  five  countries  from 
1955  to·l962o 
UoS.A.  FRANCE  r- G~"'RMANY  ITALY  u  .It. 
Overall growth  +  3  %  +  4.82  o! 
70  +  5·39 %  +  5-78 %  +  2.56 % 
Share  of labour  +  1.22 %  ·,  +  1·35 %  +  1.60 %  +  2.12 %  +  0.44 
Ql 
% I  + 
70 
Share  of  capital  +  0.73  o.84 %  +  1.57 %  +  o.8o %  +  o.8o % 
~- / 
Remainder  +  1.05 %  +  2.63 %  +  2.22 %  +  2.86 %  +  1.32  76 
Thus,  neither the  quantitative increase  in labour  and 
capital,  nor  the  qualitative  improvement  of  labour,  fully  account 
for  productive  growth in the  industrialized countries.  Far  from 
it!  In the  United States,  one-third of  growth  rem&ins  unaccounted 
for;  in Europe,  approximately half. 6 
Taking their analysis further,  Denison and Poullier bring 
in a  third factor,  that of "size"  :  growth gives rise to  econo-
mies  of scale since,  by  enlarging markets, it makes  it possible 
to  produce  more  cheaply;  moreover,  the  opening of  the  frontiers 
which has  been typical of  the  European economies  during this 
period also leads  to larger markets,  leading in turn to better 
returns.  (Denison and  Poullier,  in their calculations,  assess 
at one  tenth of  a  growth point,  for  each year,  the effect of 
opening the frontiers  on the  Common  Market  countries.)  Even  so, 
there  remains  a  share  of growth  which is not  accounted for,  and 
which is attributed to  a  so-called "residual"  factor.  This is 
still 0.76% in the  United States  (one-quarter of all growth), 
1.56% in France  (one-third),  0.87% in Germany  (one-sixth), 
1.30% in Italy (one-quarter)  and  0.87 % in Britain (one-third). 
The  work  done  on France  by  Carre,  Dubois  and  Malinvaud 
differs  from  that of Denison and  Poullier,  in particular because 
they  do  not  quantify  economies  of scale.  These  are  therefore 
included in the residual factor,  which  appears  to  be  larger as 
a  result.  On  the  other hand,  the French authors  have  made  a 
comparison between post-war  growth  (1951-1969)  and  long-term 
growth  (1913-1963).  We  can  moreover  see  from  their work what 
share  of  growth is due  to  the  quantitative  development  of  growth 
factors,  and  what  may  be  attributed to their qualitative develop-
ment. 
Here  are  these results 7 
1951-1969  1913-1963 
Overall  growth  +  5  %  +  2.1 % 
Share of the  quantity of labour 
(population and hours  of  work)  - Ool  %  - 0.3 % 
Share  of  the  quantity of capital  +  1.1 %  +  0.5 % 
1'otal of quantitative elements  +  1  %  +  0.2 % 
Share  of the  quality of labour 
(age,  education,  intensity, 
mobility of labour)  +  1  %  +  0.9 % 
Share  of the  quality of capital  +  o.4  %  -
1'otal of qualitative elements  +  1.4 %  +  0.9 % 
Residual factor  +  2.6 %  +  1.1 % 
Thus,  purely quantitative elements  only account  for  one-
fifth of growth over  the past  twenty years  and  one-tenth over  a 
fifty-year period.  In each  case  the residual factor accounts  for 
a  little over half of the  growth rate. 
All the  studies at our disposal lead to this basic obser-
vation:  economic  growth is not  due  wholly,  nor  even mainly,  to 
the  growth of production factors,  but  to elements  of another 
kind  which  appreciably enhance  the efficiency of  the_se  factors. 
Technological progress is, of  course,  one  of  these  elements  but 
is, itself,  the  consequence  of  changes in behaviour.  In a  general 
way,  social and political elements  have  played the  decisive role 
in economic  growth. 
How  are  we  to  quantify them  ? 8 
The  tentative list below  makes  no  claim  to  be  exhaustive. 
Nor  does it allow  us  to  evaluate  the  relative  share  of  each of 
the  elements  that have  been mentioned.  But it is of  very  great 
importance  for  the  assessment  we  shall have  to  make,  in the 
third part of this  survey,  of  the  possibilities and  conditions 
of  continued  growth in the  years  to  cameo 
1- The  spread of  education has  played  a  dominant  part  in~ery 
country.  It has  fitted an  increasingly large  number  of 
workers  for industry.  Without it,  the  peasant  would  have 
found it harder  to  become  a  worker;  the  worker  could  not 
have  hoped  to  see  his  children become  white-collar  employees, 
and  they in turn would  not  have  bred  the  managerial staff 
without  whom  our  technicological society would  have  been 
unable  to  flourish.  To  these  effects of  education on pro-
duction,  that is on  supply,  we  must  add its impact  on  con-
sumption,  that is on  demand.  The  schools  have  not  merely 
provided industrial society with  the  basic  manpower  which 
its factories  and  offices required;  they  have  also shar-
pened  the  desires which it needed  in order to  find  an out-
let for its ever-growing outputo  Whatever  misunderstandings 
of  maladjustmen~s may  have  troubled relations between  the 
world  of  education and  that  of  industry,  the  school has 
served  the  factory  well,  as it was  asked  to serve. 
2  - The  thirst for  material well-being  may  be  regarded,  to  some 
extent,  as  a  by-product  of  the  educational  system.  It has 
grown  to  a  size hitherto  unknown,  following  on  the  Second 
World  War,  for  the  crisis of  the  Thirties  and  the  War  in 
the  Forties had  built  up  a  tremendous  backlog  of  unfulfilled 
needs.  Certainly  no  more  than five  years  sufficed,  after the 
war,  for  a  return to  the  level of production of  the  years 
preceding the  conflict.  But all of  twenty  years  were  required 
to  mop  up  this  demand,  accumulating  over  the  lean years  and 9 
maintained  by  the  sight of  constr-1.ntly  repeated  technical 
achievements. 
3  - The  precedence  accorded  to  work  over leisure largely derives 
from  this hunger  for  consumptiono  It shows  itself, for 
instance,  in high rates of gainful employment  for  women 
in France,  this rate,  for ·women  aged  25,  increased  from  47% 
in 1954  to  56  % in 1968.  A typical  case is the  young  married 
woman  who  goes  on working  - or starts working,  in order to 
equip her  household faster.  Gainful  employment  of  women 
stands at a  particularly high level in France  (46  % of  women 
within the working  age-range)  and in Germany  (40 %),  these 
bei~g among  the  countries  that  have  known  the  fastest  growth 
it does  not  exceed 30  % in the  other  Common  Market  countries. 
Similarly,  the  decreas_e  in  ~rorking hours  has  been far slower 
than had  been expected at the  end  of  the  war.  From  1958  to 
1970  there  was  no  change  in real working  hours  per  week  in 
France  :  the  working  week  declined  by  an hour  and  a  half 
only in Germany  and  two  nours  in Italy,  but  by  three  hours 
in Belgium  and  four  hours  in the  Netherlands.  It is true  that 
annual  holidays  increas~d during this period.  But if we  con-
sider that in France,  during  the  first thirty years of this 
century,  total working  ~ours declined  by  20 %,  one  is still 
struck by  the  fact  that,  20 years after the  second wrldwar,the 
French  worked  as  long as  after the first world  war. 
4 - The  mobility of  labour  has  everywhere  been  an  important  growth 
factor  Refugees  from  East  Germany  were  responsible  for  the 
"German  miracle",  just as  the  '.vorkers  of the  Mezzogiorno, 
going  to seek employment  in Northern Italy,  were  responsible 
for  the  "Italian miracle"  and French peasants,  leaving the 
land in droves,  for  the  "French miracle".  France,  known  for 
the  low  mobility  of her  labour,  yet has,  every year,  500,000 
gainfully employed  persons  moving  to  another Departement  and 
over  two  million who  work  for  a  new  employer. 10 
5  - National ambition,  in many  countries,  has  turned to economic 
growth.  This  has  become  the  only goal which  ~he State  could 
set  before  the  nation.  This is particularly true of  those 
countries which  experienced defeat in the  last war.  It is 
probably  no  coincidence  that the  "champions  of expansion" 
have  been Japan,  Germany,  Italy and France,  all of  them 
countries with  a  glorious past,  but  which lost face  during 
the  war.  They  found  in economic  growth  a  kind of  compensa-
tion for  the  issue  of  battle - the  only  compensation,  inci-
dentally,  that the  world's  policemen - Russians  and  Mmericans  -
allowed  them  to  have.  It is no  doubt  also for  this reason 
that France,  Germany  and  Italy agreed  more  readily  than 
Britain to set  up  an Economic  Community. 
6  - Competition  between economic  systems  has  come  to  supplement, 
not  to  say replace  competition in the  traditional sense  as 
an incentive  to growth.  Socialism has  entered the lists as 
the  official challenger of  capitalism in the  Growth  Tourna-
ment.  Today  the Eastern countries  can boast  of impressive 
performances,  even if these  may  be  explained  by  the  leeway 
to  be  made  up  and if the rise in the  standard of  living does 
not  always  keep  pace  with  the  increase in output.  Per  capita 
output  over  the  last  two  decades  has  gone  up  by  5.6 % per 
annum  in Eastern Europe  as  against 3.8 % per  annum  in Western 
Europe  (statistics  compiled  by  the  United Nations  Economic 
Commission  for Europe).  One  may  well argue  this  was  not 
enough  to  make  the  Poles  or  the  Czechs  and  Slovaks  happy: 
we  still have  to  take  these  figures  into account. 
7  - The  increasing role of  the State is economic life therefore 
had  political  justifications.  Economic  policies  have  been 
refined in the  light of pre-war mistakes,  allowing  a  substan-
tial improvement  in methods  of  remedial  actiono  Europe  has 11 
thus achieved much  faster growth than hitherto,  without 
achieving higher rates,  but simply  by  greater regularityo 
Cyclic fluctuations  have  not  disappeared,  but  they have 
been far less pronounced  than formerly.  Over  the past 
twenty years,  virtually speaking,  no  country in the  Commu-
nity has  experienced a  decline in its production  expresse~ 
as an annual average,  except Germany  on one  occasion,  and 
then only to a  minor extent. 
Moreover,  States have  acted on  the  structures of the 
economy,  through nationalisation of  important ,sectors  (es-
pecially in France  and  in Britain),  direct intervention of 
public  bodies in production (Italy) substantial budgetary 
contributions to  investment finance,  the  establishment of 
social security systems,  which have  guaranteed a  solvent 
minimum  demand  whatever  the risks of life;  creation of 
planning bodies  for  investments  (especially in France)  and 
for  incomes  (Netherlands)  etc. 
All  things  considered,  the  attitude of individual 
States has  been far more  dynamic  than hitherto. 
8 - The  opening of frontiers has  been  one  of the  main  signs  of 
this  new  outlook on the part of the  authorities.  As  a  r,)sult, 
countries with a  protectionist tradition,  such as France  and 
Italy,  now  carry on half their trade with countries  from 
which  they  no  longer  exact  customs  duties while,  vis-a-vis 
third countries,  they  have  the  lowest  protective  barriers 
in the  world,  since  the  external tariff of  the  European 
Community  is, on an average,  no  more  than 6  %,  as  against 
7.1 % in the United States,  7.6 % in Britain and  9.7 % in 
Japan. 12 
Moreover  the  supremacy of the  dollar,  in spite of 
all its drawbacks,  has  guaranteed until these last few 
years  a  considerable  measum of security to  the  international 
monetary  system,  after helping  to  finance,  forreasons  that 
were  political far more  than economic,  the  reconstruction of 
the  Old  Continent. 
9  - Better management  of firms  has  gone  hand  in hand  with better 
management  of national  economies  by  the  Governments.  In the 
sphere  of  management  as  in that of  technology,  Europe  has 
had,  over  the  United States,  the  advantage  of drawing  on 
two  sources  of improvement  instead of  one:  innovation and 
imitation  (or adaptation)  of  what  had  been  done  in America. 
Nor  would  this have  been possible without  a  far-reaching 
change  in outlook,  not  only  on  the  part of  managers,  but 
also of workers. 
10 - Inflation itself seems  to  have  encouraged  growth.  Provided 
it can  be  kept  within certain limits it is indeed  the  least 
expensive  method  (certainly less so  than  unemployment,  in 
any  event),  of restoring the  balance  of  a  decentralised 
management  system in which  there is no  pre-established 
harmony  between all the  decisions  of  the  agents  of  economic 
life.  By  helping debtors,  inflation has  made  industrial risk 
more  bearable.  By  handicapping  creditors, it has  to  some 
extent redistributed capital,  and  creativity has  gained 
thereby  a 
Following  on this list,  too  long  and  yet  incomplete,  we 
can  put  forwama hypothesis  as  to  the  three  non-quantifiable 
elements  that  have  been  the  mainsprings  of  growth in Europe  since 
the  war;  these  are  the  delayed effect  on  the  economy,  after a 
lengthy period  of frustration  due  to  the  crisis and  then the  war, 
of  the  mass  education  campaign  undertaken at the  end  of  the  19th 
Century;  the  mobilisation of  collective energies  for industrialiea-13 
tion,  as  the  only  collective goal available after the  holocaust 
of  the  second world  war,  bearing in mind  the  fear  that any  new 
conflict might  degenerate  into a  nuclear apocalypse,  and  the 
existence of  a  Communist  challenge  on  the  economic  plane;  finally 
the  existence  of  a  pattern for  industrialisation,  verbally dis-
owned  but  constantly followed in practice,  the  American pattern, 
a  relative factor  of security in what  remained  a  venture  into  the 
unknown. 
Education,  defeat,  the  Communist  challenge  and  the  American 
precedent  - a  strange  mixture  of ethical,  social  and political 
factors  which explain why  Europe  yielded herself  up,  for  twenty 
years,  to  love  of a  growth rate.  Britain was  an exception,  per-
haps  because  her elixir lacked  the  bitter aroma  of  defeat;  per-
haps  also  because,  as  the first nation to  become  industrialised, 
she  was  the first to experience  the  need  to restrict growth in 
order  to retain a  certain style of life.  American,  in her  turn, 
is faltering,  because  there  is no  pathfinder to  light her  way. 
X 
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B - THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  GROWTH 
We  have  just seen that growth has  social and political 
origins; it also  leads  to social and political consequences.  The 
accumulation of wealth,  and  changes  in its distribution, alter 
social behaviour.  As  a  result,  far  from  appeasing  conflicts, 
growth kindles  them. 
Economic  development  has  everywhere  brought  ab~ut an 
appreciable  increase in material well-being.  The  facts  are  known. 
All  classes  have  gained,  but  not  to  the  same  extent.  The  costs 
and  the  benefits of  growth are  not  evenly distributed. 
In the first place,  we  must  remenber  that all classes have 
not  paid  an equal price  for  growth.  Among  those  who  have  borne 
the  heavies ~  we  must  mention migrants  of every kind,  because 
the  fact  of leaving a  firm,  a  region or  a  country for  economic 
reasons  involves  deep  social and  emotional  upheaval.  Farmers  and 
peasants  have  had  more  than their share of this  :  they were  24  % 
of  the  Community's  workers  in 1955;  they are  now  no  more  than 
13 % and  this figure is expected to fall to  6 % in 1980.  From 
1958  to  1970  those  working in Community  agriculture  have  declined 
by  6.5 million;  a  further  loss of  two  million is almost  certain 
between 1971  and  1975o 
Some  industries have  experienced  a  contraction of  manpower 
which is as  considerable,  though less well  known:  the  labour  force 
in the  coal industry declined  by  60  % between 1958  and  1970 
(625,000  people  fewer),  similarly in iron mines,  where  manpower 
has  shrunk from  58,100 in 1958  to  18,400 in 1970.  In textiles 
the  ~ork force is down  by  25  % (400,000 people)  and  in shipbuilding 
by  15% to  20%  (50,000)o  Altogether it is thought  that,  in twelve 
years,  two  million  jobs  have  been  abolished in the  Community's 
industries.  Naturally,  many  others have  been  created over  the  same 
period,  but  these  changes  of occupation are  not  without  their real f 
•  15  -
human  cost,  even if they  go  hand in hand  with  a  rise in the 
standard of living. 
Migration between  countries has  grown  to  a  considerable 
size over the past  few  years.  Thus  the  number  of foreign workers 
employed in the  Community  alone,  in 1970,  was  3.5 million,  or 
more  than double  what it was  in 1961.  Out  of this total the 
number  of  workers  coming  from  a  Community  country  (mainly Italy) 
has  scarcely varied,  remaining  below  a  million.  They  are  a  true 
proletariat,  with few  skills (in Germany,  75  ~ of foreign workers 
are  unskilled),  often ill-paid and ill-housed  (in 1969 it was 
estimated that,  in France,  600,000  workers  lived in hovels, 
though  they wer·e  20  ~ of the  labour force  in the  building trade 1  ) 
often even  unwelcome.  In its guidelines for  a  "Community  Social 
Programme",  the  Brussels Commission wrote,  in 1971,  on this 
subject  :  "We  have  seen the  cultural gap  widening  between immi-
grant workers  and  the  people  of  most  countries.  One  finds,  in·some 
circles reticence  or mistrust in the  face  of  a  foreign presence 
which is regarded  as  excessive".  Foreign workers  ,are  often "shock 
absorbers"  for  cyclic fluctuations,  real  nomads  of industrial 
society. 
Germany's  example is particularly telling in this respect, 
if we  consider variations since 1960  in industrial output  and  in 
the  net balance  of  migrat~on 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  I 
Industrial output  I 
(in ~)  +10.7  +6o3  +4.5  +2.7  +8.5  +6.3  +2.3  -2.4  +9.5  +10.4 
Net  balance  of 
migration  (in 
OOO's)  +336  +419  +283  +237  +301  +344  +132  -177  +278  +572 16 
While  the  costs  of  growth are  unevenly  spread,  are its 
p~ofits more  equitably shared out  ?  This is a  difficult question 
to  answer,  as  there  are  few  meaningful  figures  on  the  way  the 
distribution of  income  has  evolved. 
A first and  very  global  approach is to  observe  trends in 
average  per  capita income  in a  number  of  countries,  for  instance 
those  of  the  European Community,  over  a  given period,  for  instance 
1958  to  1969.  If we  take  the  per  capita average  share  of  the 
Community  product  as  a  starting base  of 100,  we  find  the  following 
evolution 
! 
Germany  France  Italy  Netherlands  Belgium  Luxembourg 
1958  110  129  61  85  115  142 
: 1969  lll  122  67  96  104  116 
L 
These  figures  show  a  genuine  convergence  of  average  incomes 
in the  Community  countries,  since  in 1958  the  largest single  gap 
(between Italy and  Luxembourg)  was  81  points,  whereas  in 1969 
(this  time  between Italy and  France)  it is only  55  points. 
But  distribution between  countries  means  far  less than 
distribution between  social  classes.  From  1958  to  1970  the  natio-
nal product  per  gainfully  employed  person  (at  constant prices) 
increased  by  70  % within the  Community.  What  do  we  know  about  the 
~'ay  wage  and  salary earners,  and  others,  shared  out  this  increase? 
We  ~ust bear  in mind  not  only  income  trends  within each  category, 
but  also  the  numerical  strength of  each  :  7,000,000 more  wage  and 
salary earnem over  this period,  and  5  million  fewer  working  on 
their own  account  or  as  part  of  a  family  unit.  The  Brussels 
Commission  has  published statistics in average  earning per  wage 
or  salary earner  as  a  perbentage  of  average  income  per gainfully 
employedperson in each  countr~ if the  wage-earner's  share is 17 
rising,  this  means  he  is really "biting" into the revenues  of 
industry and  of property taken as  a  whole.  Here  are  the  figures 
for  each  country  : 
1958  1960  1965  1970 
Germany  80.2 %  78.5 %  80.5 %  81.9 % 
France  81.7 %  80.4 %  82.9 %  8o.8 % 
Italy  88  %  86.7 %  87.2 %  84.8% 
Netherlands  76  %  72.5 %  78.7%  81.1 % 
Belgium  77.8 %  76.6  %  77.8%  79.6 % 
Luxembourg  91.9 %  83.9 %  91.4 %  91-7  % 
(1) 
Source . Statistics of  the  European Communities  . 
(1)  in 1968 
In fact  one  does  not  find  (over  a  twelve-year period!)  any 
significant  change.  Allowing for  unforeseen temporary  developments 
in the  economic  situation,  wage  and  salary earners  have  approxi-
mately kept  their slice of  the  cake  in Germany,  France  and 
Luxembourg;  they  have  appreciably increased it in the  Netherlands 
(through the  abandonment  of  the  wage  controls policy)  and  to  a  les-
ser extent in Belgium,  while  they  have  lost ground in Italy,  where 
the  "economic  miracle"  has  long  been performed  on  the  workers' 
backs,  a  fact  which is doubtless  not  unconnected  with the  aggrava-
tion of social tensions  in that  country  over  the  past  four  years. 
However,  when  considering Italy,  we  should also  bear in mind  the 
disappearance  of the  poorest peasant holdings,  which  has  had  the 
effect of  appreciably raising the  average  income  of other self-
employed  persons.  Another  OECD  survey  (quoted  as  an  annex)  on  the 
same  subject,  but  with  a  different approach shows  that,  taking 
Europe  as  a  whole,  the  Common  Market  countries  have  been relati-
vely less generous  to  their wage  and  salary earners  than other 
countries. 
Nor  does  the  trend in wages  and  salaries  by  sectors  show 
any  appreciable  narrowing  of gaps  in remuneration;  on  the  contrarv~ 18 
in all Community  countries,  the  maximum  gap  widened  between 1964 
and  1970  : 
MAXIMUM  GAP  BETWEEN  HOURLY  RATES  OF  WORKERS  IN  THE  BEST-PAID 
AND  WORST-PAID  SECTORS 
(in points,  the  average  for all industries being 100) 
1964  l2lQ 
Germany  39  43 
France  62  90 
Italy  88  95 
Netherlands  76  85 
Belgium  84  87 
Sources . Statistics of the  European Communities  . 
Regional inequalities also remain  very  considerable,  while 
tending to  narrow  down  in France  and Italy,  where  they were  the 
greatest,  remaining steady in Germany  and  getting worse  in the 
Netherlands  : 
MAXIMUM  GAP  BETWEEN  HOURLY  RATES  OF  WORKERS,  BY  REGIONS 
(in points,  the  average  for  each  country being 100) 
1964  1970 
Germany  22  22 
France  33  26 
Italy  29  24  (1) 
Netherlands  (2)  6  10 
Sources  :  Statistics of  the  European Communities. 
(1)  In 1969 
(2)  Gap  between North  and South Holland,  and  the 
Province  of Utrecht,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
other provinces  taken as  a  whole,  on  the  other. 19 
As  for differences in remuneration between men  and  women, 
the Treaty of Rome  expressly provided for their disappearance  (this 
was,  indeed,  on,  of its few  social objectives),  but  they still 
continue.  A very  careful survey made  in 1966  (8 years after the 
Treaty  c~e into effect)  by  the  European Communities  found  the 
gap  to be,  for the  textile and  food  industries,  13  ~ in Italy, 
15 ~ in France,  21  ~ in Germany,  22  ~ in Belgium  and  28  ~ in the 
Netherlands. 
Little of a  specific nature is known  about  the hierarchy of 
wages  and salaries according to qualifications.  However,  a  study 
carried out in 1968-69  for  the Centre d'Etudes des  revenue et des 
co~ts in France  has  just· been published.  It gives interesting 
details starting from  surveys  made  of  firms  having subsidiaries 
in different countries,  and  for which posts  could  be  defined with 
accUracy. 
RANGE  OF  WAGES  AND  SALARIES  IN  1968-69 
Between  the  semi- Between  the  average 
skilled worker  and  for workers  and  the 
executive  cadre  average  for  cadres 
·Ration before  after  Ratio  before  after 
taxation  taxation  taxation  taxation 
Britain  1 . 13.9  1 . 9.4  1 . 3·7  1  . 3  .  .  .  . 
Italy  1  . 12.9  1  . 9-7  1  . 3·7  1 . 3·3  .  .  .  . 
France  1 . 11.7  1  . 8.6  1 . 3·9  1 . 3o5  .  .  .  . 
NetherlaDis  1 . 11.4  1 . 7  1 . 3.4  1 . 2.9  .  .  .  . 
Germany  1 . 11.2  1 . 8.3  1 . 3  1 
I  2.7  .  .  .  . 
u.s.A.  1 . 8.6  1  . 6.9  1 . 2.8  1 . 2.6  .  .  .  I 
Source . Centre  d'etude  des  revenus et des  coats  (Paris)  . 
These  figures,  compared  to the  average  level of  remunera-
tion for  each  country,  show  that the  countries where  wages  and 
salaries are highest  (especially workers'  wages)  have  the  smallest 
hierarchical differentials - these  countries  being the  United 20 
States and  Germany.  It therefore  seems  that in France,  Italy, 
Britain and  the  Netherlands,  wages  are  abnormally  low.  But  taxation 
systems  play  a  particularly significant part in redistributing 
incomes  in Britain and in the  Netherlands  - much  less  so in France 
and in Italy,  which  indicates  these  two  countries  as  the  most 
vulnerable  to  working-class  demands. 
For France  we  have  an  IRREE  study  on trends in the  differen-
ces  between the  average  incomes  of  extreme  categories  (in this  par~ 
ticular  case  managerial staff and  the  liberal professions  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  unemployed  and  retired on  the  other): 
1956  1962(1)  1962(2)  1965 
Original  income  1  . 9.2  1  . 10.5  1 
0  9.9  1  . 9o5  .  0  .  . 
FinRl  income  (3)  1  . 5  1 
0  5·1  1  . 4.9  1  . 4.4  .  .  .  . 
(1)  Calculated  on  the  same  basis  as  in 1956.  (2)  Calculated  on 
the  same  basis as  in 1965.  (3)  After  deducting  tax and  adding 
welfare  benefitso 
The  vigorous  economic  growth in this  decade  has  not  led to 
a  closing of  the  gap  between  gross  incomes;  far  from it.  But  some 
redistribution has  been  achieved  through welfare  benefits,  far 
more  than  through direct  taxation. 
We  now  have  some  facts  which  bring  us  tothe  kernel  of  this 
part of our report:  economic  growth  does  not  dry  up  the  sources 
of  conflict:  it multiplies  them  along with  the  wealthwttlch,  more-
over, it cannot  of itself share  out  in a  more  equitable  way. 21 
If we  analyse  trends in the  number  of  labour disputes in 
the  Community,  basing ourselves  on  the  number  of working days 
lost 'through strikes,  we  shall find  an appreciable rise in tempo 
over  the  past  few  years  for  most  countries  (see  detailed table in 
the  Annex): 
Germany  France  Italy  Netherlands  Belgium  •rotal 
1960-1963 
(thousands)  1,482  11,562  1  49,789  538  943  64,314 
1964-1967 
(thousands)  483  10,202  43,074  118  1,229  55,106 
1968-1971  I 
! 
(thousands)  727  107,663 i 74,611  6o8  3,452  187,121 
l 
Over  the past  four years  there  have  been twice  as  many  days 
lost through strikes as  over  the  two  preceding four-year  periodso 
Even if one  leaves  the  French strikes of  May  1968  out  of the 
reckonin·g  (but  why  should one  leave  them  out  ? )  disputes  would 
still be  half as  many  again as  in the  earlier periods. 
And  these  are  only  the  traditional disputes  between employers 
and  workers,  involving labour  stopp~ges that  can  be  identified 
through statistics.  But  the  claims-staking attitude has  extended 
to other  categories  beyond  the  working  class,  by  imitation,  first 
9f all (asserting claims is profitable);  because  the  frustration 
bred  by  industrial society itself has  no  cause  to  stop at  the 
frontiers  of  the  working  class;  but  also  because  the  self-employed 
(farmers,  shopkeepers,  craftsmen,  doctors)  have,  in turn,  a  "boss" 
to attack - the State,  which  cannot  stand  aside  from  economic life 
in view  of  the  political importance  this has  taken  on in our 
societies. 22 
The  increase in the  size of  the  conflicts is not,  perhaps, 
the  most  interesting feature  of recent developments.  After all, in 
a  country like France,  where  about  3000 million wage-earning days 
are  worked each year,  even  an  exceptionally disturbed year such as 
1968 only  cuts off 100 million days  (partly recovered later, it 
may  be  added).  The  forms  and  objectives of disputes  have  also 
developed,  and  their development  is no  less significant  for  the 
future. 
In a  paper  presented at the  1971  Bruges  Week,  on industrial 
relations in Europe,  Eugene  Descamps  (then Secretary-General of 
the  French CFDT)  gave  a  series of practical examples  of  types  of 
dispute,  differing from  the  traditional strike,  taken  from  France 
in 1970-71: 
- sit-in strikes; 
- strikes with seizure of plant; 
- goslow strikes  (in civil aviation); 
- "thrombosis" strikes,  involving a  small department,  but  one  of 
vital importance  in an entreprise·,  brl.nging its whole  operation 
to  a  standstill,  such as  a  spray-painting workshop  in the  motor 
industry or a  computer  depRrtment  in steel-making; 
- guerilla strikes  (small,  unexpected  stoppages recurring at 
different  points in a  factory); 
- hunger  strikes  (used  by  the staff of  a  large  store  and  by 
coalface  miners)  etc. 
One  of  the  most  remarkable  features  of these  last few  years 
has  been  the  appearance  of so-called "wildcat" strikes,  started 
without  the  approval  of the  trade  union organisations:  Limburg 
miners'  strike in Belgium in 1970;  Rotterdam port strike, in the 
Netherlands,  i~ 1970;  German  steelworkers'  strike in the  autumn 
of  1969;  in Britain,  the  phenomenon already dates  back  a  long  time, 
since in 1964-66  there  were  already 1,700,000 working  days  lost in 
2,171  unofficial strikes,  as against  733,000 days  lost in 74 official strikes  (Report  of  the. Royal  Commission  on Trade  Unions 
and Employers'  Associations);  dockers'  strike in Gothenburg  and 
miners'  strike at Kiruna in Sweden at the  end  of 1969. 
It is not surprising that these  "wildcat" strikes appeared 
in countries where  the  wa$e-earning population is strongly unionized 
(Belgb••  66-, Bd.tain 4~, Methc'l.aD49 4~, Gerlllany 36~); similar occurren-
ces are not seen in France,  where  strikes do  not  have  to  be  "recog-
nized"  by  the  unions,  which  are reluctant to  play an "official" 
role,  and in which  a  far smaller proportion of wage-earners  are 
involved  (20  ~). 
In fact,  every wildcat strike has its own  history.  But, 
taken together,  and  added  to  a  "contesting" mentality which differs 
from  the  traditional "claiming" mentality,  mean  that  trade  unionism 
has  grown  bun.ucratic like other forms  of social organisation and 
that it suffers,  like all other institutions,  from  a  crisis of 
authority and of its representative  character. 
If we  consider  the  history of labour relations since  the 
beginning of  the  century in all the  industrial nations,  we  shall 
observe  a  general  trend,  through many  disputes,  towards  their 
institutionalisation.  Recognition of  the  right to strike and of 
trade  union organisation,  the  elaboration of procedures  for  collec-
tive bargaining,  mediation and  arbitration,  the  signing.of  contra~, 
consultation with employers'  and  workers'  organisation for  the 
definition of economic policy,  are  the  main stages in a  development 
which has  gradually extended  to all Western countries.  It was  the 
will of the  workers,  organised in their trade  unions;  it was 
increasingly in the interest of  governments,  anxious  to shield 
their policy from  social unrest,  and  of industrialists,  anxious 
to fulfil insistent demand  and  to amortize  the  increasingly 
expensive  plant required by  modern  technology.  At  the  same  time 24 
as it must  find  outlets  by  manufacturing its market  along  with 
the  product it will sell there  (this is the  role of advertising), 
the  entreprise  has  to  ensure  a  ·regular supply of  labour  by  nego-
tiating contracts'  with the  employees'  representatives. 
This  development  found  its logical  conclusion in top-level 
coordination to regularize  wage  movements  as  such - this  took 
place in the  Netherlands  until the  sixties  and  in Britain under 
the  Wilson government.  The  incomes  policy  was  the  culminating 
point of  coordination between  trade  unions  and  the  authoriti&s. 
It was  so  advanced,  in fact,  that the  position could  not  be  held. 
France,  which  was  some  way·behind  other industrialized countries 
as  regards  labour relations,  has  made  up  part of this  leeway 
since  the  1968  crisis:  the  so-called "contractual policy"  of  the 
Chaban-Delmas  government  exemplifies  how  it is  closing  the  gap. 
Only,  at  the  same  time  as  this process  of  the  institution-
alisation of  disputes  was  going  on,  there  has  also  emerged  another 
process  of denial  of  authority  (including  trade  union authority) 
and  radical  criticism of  the  whole  system  of  economic  and  social 
organisation.  It is the  superposition of  the  two  movements  (for 
the  second  has  not  caused  the  first  to  disappear,  even if it has 
slowed it down)  that  typifies  the  present  stage  of industrial 
relations. 
We  must  of  course  make  a  careful distinction between  the 
situation in different  countries.  Radical  contestation is weaker 
in Northern Europe  than in the  Latin countries  (France  and  Italy), 
wh~ch did  not prevent  wildcat strikes  from  developing in countries 
that  were  supposed  to  be  calm  and  disciplinedo  There  are,  however, 
some  common  features,  and  in particular,  the  following:  the  in-
creasing importance  of  working  conditions  in the  outbreak of 
disputes  (there  again,  demands  for  better working  conditions, 25 
particularly on assembly lines,  have  not  done  away  with wage 
claims)  and  the  transfer of the  claiming  power  from  the  level of 
the  industry to that of  the  entre  prise. One of the reasons  why 
unions  have  been  caught off balance in recent disputes is pre-
cisely the  fact  that they are  organised mainly at industry level: 
it is on this level that  they  negotiate.  But,  from  now  on,  claims 
are  increasingly being pressed at entreprise level;  that is where 
the  wage-earner  feels  most  intensely the  weight  of  working  condi-
tions,  which he  finds all the  harder  to  bear  because  he  has  acquir-
ed,  through education,  unused  ab~lities or frustrated desires. 
The  same  fact  of mass  education which  was,  at an earlier stage,  a 
decisive  condition of  growth,  may,  beyond  a  certain level,  compel 
a  change  in the  type  of growth.  It is well  that  the  semi-skilled 
worker  should be  able  to  read  and  count,  but if he  knows  more,  he 
will no  longer  want  to  be  a  semi-skilled worker.  What  the  worker 
is ever less to  accept is not  his wage  (though  he  always  wants it 
increased and,  for  the  boss,  increasing it is often a  way  of 
getting the  other  claims off his back);  it is the  deadening effect 
of uninteresting work  and  submission to  the  authoritarianism of 
the  "petty boss" in the  workshop. 
Technological progress has  bY.  no  means  brought  about  the 
end  of repetitive  work.  The  labourer-tradesman couple  of the first 
stage of industrialisation has  been replaced  by  a  semi-skilled 
worker-technician  combination,  in which the  mass  of semi-skilled 
workers  shows  absolutely  no  tendency to decrease. 
But  this wage-earner in the  workshop  has  become  awamof his 
strength at the  same  time  as  he  felt the  need  to  shake  off his 
condition.  His  strength lies in the  increasing  complexity of the 
entreprise.  Each of its wheels  controls  many  others;  the  entre-
prise  must  not  stop if it wants  to  get returns  on its increasingly 
expensive  machinery;  moreover,  with improved  management,  it carries 
less and  less  stock; it is therefore  more  vulnerable.  Hence  it is 26 
no  longer  necessary  to mobilise  the  mass  of  wage-earners  in a 
whole  industry  - a  task for  which  the  union ramains  irreplaceable  -
in order  to  have  a  chance  of successfully pressing a  claim.  It is 
enough  to act at the right  time  in the  right  placeo 
This  development  may  have  very  important  consequences  for 
the  future.  We  are  seeing an  "atomisation"  of labour disputes: 
each is going  to  fight  on  his  own,  with his  own  weapons  and  tar-
gets.  It will  be  necessary  to  negotiate  much  more  at entreprise 
level;  but  heads  of entreprises have  got  into the  habit  of  shel-
tering before  their professional organisations'  specialist ad-
visers.  This  will  no  longer  be  possiQle.  They  will have  to  go  out 
and  negotiate  themselves,  and  prepare  themselves  accordingly.  At 
the  highest  level in a  firm,  it will  be  necessary  to  change  the 
order of priorities and  sometimes  devote  more  time  to settling a 
problem  of  the  organisation of  work  than to settling an investment 
problem. 
For  the  unions,  the  consequences  are  no  less hazardous. 
They  already  had  tricky problems  of homogeneity  and  compatibility 
due  to  the  increase  in the  number  of  workers  they  were  called to 
organise  :  for  the  Community  as  a  whole,  the  proportion of  wage 
and  salary earners  has  gone  up  from  68  % of  the  gainfully  employed 
population in 1958  to  78  % today.  Within the  ranks  of the  wage  and 
salary earners,  workers  are  losing their preponderance  but  the 
organisations remain  stamped  by  their working-class  tradition. 
An  uneasy  compatibility will have  to  be  maintained  between workers, 
white-collar staff,  technicians  and  cadres,  each with  a  distinctive 
mentality  and  with distinctive  claims. 
At  the  same  time  as it is asked  by  ~he government  to  nego-
tiate at  the  summit,  the  trade  union is therefore  drawn  by  its 
grass roots  towards  a  variety of actions.  It must  therefore  hold 
the  authorities off at arm's  length.  It may  do  this  by  publicizing 
its political opposition to  the  government  or  by  proclaiming its 
condemnation of  the  capitalist system but it may  then find itself 
in difficulties with another  facet  of  the  lack of  uniformity  among its troops,  namely  their political diversityo  With  over  80  % 
of the population wage-earning or salaried, it includes  conser-
vativee  and  progressives  together;  one  must  then try not  to 
frighten away  the  ones  in order to please  the  others. 
So  the social struggle  becomes  more  intense at the  same 
time  as it becomes  more  diversified and,  in some  ways,  more 
radical.  It poses  new  problems,  of  considerable  importance for 
the  future  of growth;  in particular,  problems  of power  and  of 
social consensuso 
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C - THE  FUTURE  OF  GROWTH 
To  a  Frencluaan,  diacusaiona  on·  tlte  future  of growtll.  are 
evolving at a  disconcerting speed.  Two  years  ago,  waen  tae VIta 
Plan was  u.nder  consideration,  all tae talk was  of "Japanese-st7le 
growtll.",  and rates of expansion between 6 % and  8  ~ per  annum 
were  being mentioned for France;  today  tll.e  work  •one  D7  , •• 
"Club of Rome",  and  American  tll.eses  on tlte  blessings of  "zero 
growth"  are  becoming  fashionable  themses.  It is clear that man-
kind  cannot  go  on indefinitely increasing its numbers  bJ 2  ~ per 
annum  and its output  by  5  ~;  that is, as is happening  tOdaJ, 
doubling its population eyery  thirty years  and its production 
eyery fifteen yearso  This  would  lead to grossl7 unreasonable 
figures  :  28,000 million human  beings  on Earth in 2060  (ten times 
more  than a  century  earli~r);  world production of 200  billion 
dollars at the  same  date  (seventy  times  the  p~esent figure)  I 
The  experts of  the  Massachusetts Institute of Technology  can 
readily prove  that food  resources  and  the  raw  materials of indus-
try will be  exhausted  long before,  and  even if that is not  the 
case,  growth will have  choked  to ieath through the pollution of 
the  natural elements  our  biosphere  has  but  a  limited capacity 
to recycle  the waste  products of our  affluence.  So  much  for  that. 
But  we  do  not  know  eyen the  approximate  limits of this 
capacity.  Similarly,  we  do  not  know  if the  relation between 
production and  pollution is a  constant.  Indeed there  are  good 
reasons  for  believing that it is not,  for  everything depends  on 
the  density of production;  if it were  better distributed over  the 
world as  a  whole,  Nature's  capacity for  a.bsorption would  be 
far  better used;  when  one-third of  the  world's  production takes 
place in one  small part of  the territory of  a  single  country, 29 
the Uni\ed S'ates,  we  must  not  be  surprised at a  breakdown in the 
ecological balance.  At  the  same  time,  experience  shows  that a 
higher standard of livins leads  to  a  decrease in fertilit7.  The 
economic  an• social development of the  Third World  could there-
fore  have  positive effects in this connection.  Now  if we  start 
from  the hfpothesis that population  w~uld onl~ grow  slowl7 be7ond 
10,000 million people  (still three  times  todaJ's figure),  in order 
to give each of these  people  the present-day standard of living of 
an American,  world production of 50 billion dollars would  be  re-
quired,  that is seventeen times  more  than todaJ•  This  figure  would 
be  reached half-way  through the  21st  century  (children born this 
7ear would  see it with their own  eyes)  with an annual growth rate 
reduced  to 3.5 ~ per annum.  But  there  may  be  variations depending 
on  changes in the distribution of growth.  One  per cent  growth in 
the  American  economy  represents  10,000 million dollars a  Jear dis-
tributed among  200  million people;  but this same  sum  of money, 
applied to  the  Third World,  would  represent a  growth rate in 
excess of 2  ~ for over 2000 million people. 
These  calculations make  no  claim to be  scientific,  but 
the7 indicate orders of magnitude  which  are  not as  close  to 
Doomsda7  as those often used  to  justify a  neo-Malthusianism that 
is particularlJ advantageous  to well-heeled nations.  What  a  tem·p-
tation it is to  close  the  ticket-gates of progress  behind  us, 
explaining to the Third World  and to  the  poor in our own  countries 
that a  car,  a  television set an4  a  bathroom are  enough  to  make  men 
happJ  and  to  justifJ them  in ceasing to  misuse  nature,  so that 
they  can hear Bach  undisturbeal 
Growth  certainl7 cannot  go  on forever,  and it will slow 
down  appreciably in the  next hundred yearso  It is not  too  soon 
to start thinking about ito  But  for  the  next  twent7 years it is 
not likelJ to die of scarcit7 or asphyxia.  Its continuance,  in 
the European countries,  depends  on a  series of cultural,  social 
and political conditions;  for  we  have  seen these  were  the  condi-
tions that gave rise to growth,  in the  same  wa7  as  the  conse-
quences of  growth themselves  take  cultural,  social and political 
forms. 30 
1  - Cultural conditions.  The  mainspring of economic 
4eYelopment,  for  the past hundred years,  has  been the  spread of 
education ana specifically of primar7 education.  We  ma7  wonder 
whether  uniYeraal  secondar7 education and  the  ver7 rapid spreaa 
of higher education will not  haYe  the  opposite effect.  The  forms 
of industrialisation that were  suited to  a  primarJ-educatei 
population ma7  no  longer  be  acceptable to  a  secondary-e4ucated 
population,  which has  new  requirements as regards  working condi-
tion and  types of authorit7,  while  the  apparatus of production 
ani the style of  command  only progress  slowly.  This is a  reason 
for  thinking that the  "education explosion"  (which  we  cannot 
expect  to stop,  for it has  become  a  need in itself and is, more-
over,  essential in order to keep  up  our technological standards) 
will not  necessarily have  the  same  effects on  growth as  the first 
stage of  uniYersal primar7 education. 
Moreover  the  existence of  comparatiYe  affluence  among  some 
classes of  the population,  and  specifically amons  those  who 
possess  knowledge  and inherit power,  alters their scales of values. 
The  generations that have  not  known  scarcit7 do  not  react like 
those  that recall ito  The7  take  the  motorcar  and  the  washing  machine 
for  granted  (and haTe  no  intention of doing  without  them)  but do 
not regard  them  as  achievements.  Saying,  work,  rational action 
become  secondary  values  when  set beside others,  such as enjo7ment, 
leisure and  amenity.  The  classical age  of industrialisation gives 
way  to  the  Romantic  period of a  new  sensitiYity.  Not  to  mention 
the  fact  that human  nature  ma7  stifle in an excessiYelJ rational 
un1verse.  People  may  take  orders  from  an authoritarian boss  and 
achieve  psychological liberation b7  counting him  as  one  of  man1 
stupid dictators,  but if standards of behaviour are  imposed  on 
them in their·work or in their life in the  name  of logic and - 3~-
cold reason alone,  the  situation ma7  become  intolerable  because 
there is no  longer aQJ  excuse  for refusing to obe7.  !he dictator-
ship of an organisation is in consequence  far harder to bear than 
that of a  boss.  One  therefore has to devise  forms  of organisation 
which preserve irrational areas,  as  one  might  aesign,ate  national 
parks an• pedestrian precincts. 
!here is at the ver7 heart of industrial eociet7 a  basic 
contradiction,  that which rends  man  apart  between the  increasingl7 
demanding rationalisation imposed  on him  as a  producer,  and  the 
appeal to his most  anarchical and  luxurious tastes as a  conauaer. 
The  syste• requires the  same  man  to live eightlDurs each·ia7 under 
the dictatorship of reason,  and  for  the rest of the  time  to 7iel• 
to all his most  chaotic impulses.  What  sort of willpower is he 
expected to have,  in order to imprison these instincts at the  very 
moment  when  he  crosses the threshold of his faotorJ!  We  should not 
wonder  that people feel  confused  toaa7,  just as an emploJer  shoula 
not  be  surprised when  his workers  ask for a  rise, while  he  is him-
self  p~tting posters  up  at the factory gates urging  these  same 
workers  to holi•a1 in Majorca or  b~ another car  ••• 
2  - Social conditions.  Among  factors that will encourage 
growth to continue in Europe  for  the  next  ten or twent7 Jears, 
we  shoul• mention the quantitJ of unfulfilled material needs, 
still felt  by  a  large part of the population.  The  average  standard 
of livins of an Englishman,  a  German  or a  Frenchman still remains 
20  ~ below  that of a  Swede;  the  gap  between the latter's standard 
of living and  that of an Italian is  a~ wide  as  40  ~ (according to 
an estimate made  b7  Andre  Piatiers, Director of  the Ecole  pratique 
•es Sautes Etudes in Paris~ If we  aefine relative povert7 in 
European countries as the level of income  which  does  not  allow a 
family  to  buy  consumer  durables, it is estimated that 14  ~ ·of 
Frenchmen ana 19  ~ of Italians still fall short of this standard. - 32-
But if overall growth is slowing  ciown,  this means  the  lot of those 
who  are  worse  off can onl,- be  improved  by  trimming  down  the stJle 
of life of  those  who  are  better off.  Any  slowing aown  of  growth, 
at this stage,  will contribute  to social conflict. 
In a  more  general way  we  may  consider that unskilled workers 
(the largest group),  many  farmers,  most  foreign workers  and  a  high 
proportion of  those  who  have  retired  live under conditions  which 
they rightly feel to  be  intolerable,  when  they see  the  conquest 
of outer space,  heart transplants and supersonic flight.  To  this 
general deprivation may  be  adaed  more  specific areas of Jrustra-
tion for  larger sections of·the population,  for  instance as regards 
transport: it was  Presi4ent Nixon himself  who  wondered  why  it was 
easier to seni three  men  to the Moon  than to resolYe  the  traffic 
problems  of  a  cityo 
Another  element  which is helpful to  growth in Europe  is the 
existence of  a  reserve  army  of workers in the  agricultural sectoro 
They  will  continue  to  supply  manpower  for  the  other sectors of the 
economy  over  the  next  ten years or so.  Thereafter this pool of 
labour will doubtless run dry. 
On  the  other hand,  the aspiration to enjoy greater oppor-
tunities for  well-being will undoubteDy lead to  a  reduction in 
working hours  (for all types of work)  which will be  greater over 
the  next  ten years  than it has  been over  the last ten. 
Finally, it is difficult to  foresee  what  impact  the inevit-
able  intensification of social stresses will have  on growth.  We 
have  already seen that existing procedures  for  the institutiona-
lisation of  disputes  (which are  conducted at General Staff level) 
may  no  longer  be  appropriate  for  settling new  forms  of disputes, 
which  are  more  localized at factory or even  sho~ floor level,  and 
which  are  also more  violent.  This decentralisation of  conflicts -33-
will be  at the  expense of the trade  union apparatus,  which will 
therefore stand further  back from  employers  and  goYernment  autho-
rities, in order to maintain contact with the grass roots. It 
would  be  Yain to  count  on the  unions  to keep  the  workers  under 
control at all times. 
In adaition to  changes in the level at which disputes take 
place,  there will be  changes in their nature.  Along with demands 
for remuneration,  there are  now  those  which have  to ao  with status 
and  power.  Some,  of course  (the Communists  among  them)  see  the 
transfer of power  (common  ownership of the  means  of proiuction)  as 
a  necessary ana sufficient condition to  improve  the distribution 
of wealtho  Others,  who  are often lumped  together as "Leftists", 
do  not  think in terms of  claiming power,  but of resisting it in 
order to weaken it, because  they feel it is intolerable  from  the 
stanapoint of human  liberty;  their real objective is not  to take 
it over but  to bring it down.  Finally there are  those  who  demand 
change,  not  only to transfer power  to social classes which did 
not  have it b$fore,  but to exercise it in a  different waJ  (this 
view is found,  especially,  among  the  proponents of workers'  control). 
In fact  the exercise of authority within the  firm will in-
eyitably pose  basic problems  over the  next  few  years.  Them cannot 
continue  to  be  an ever-widening gap  between the size of the social 
resp.onsibilities which  the  firm  assumes  and  the  narrow  basis of 
consent  on which its legitimacy rests.  With  concentration of indus-
try an• the  appearance  of multi-national corporations,  we  are  be-
ginning to see  clusters of firms  which  provide  a  living for hun4reds 
of thousanas  of workers,  which serve  the  needs  of millions  and 
whose  decisions  carry greater weight  than those  of the State in 
the social and  economic  balance of  a  nationo  In our  system  today, 
these  super-powers  have  no  legal constitutions other  than those -M-
arising from  the right of property;  this right,  on its own, 
makes  them  legitimate even if, as in most  cases,  the  owner  no 
longer exercises power  but  delegates it to specialist groups 
recruited by  co-option.  This  brings  about  an  imbalance,  which 
will  not  be  tolerated much  longer,  between responsibilit7 and 
legitimac7,  all the  more  so  now  that there is the  beginning of 
a  trend towards  the  assumption by  firma  of  new  social responsi-
bilities: in the United States,  public opinion is urging  them 
to take  an interest in the fight against pollution and in the 
education of racial minorities.  The  nations will think in the 
end,  as once  the1 dia with their kings,  that  too  much  power  has 
been entrusted to  men  who  are  not  accountable  to  themo 
If social conflicts become  sharper,  can they endanger 
the  very fabric of social life ?  May  not  this fabric  be  rent 
asunder  ?  This is a  fearful question,  especially for the  propo-
nents  of European unityo  In a  way,  this unity answers  a  deeply-
felt  need  to  divide  power,  so as  to  make  it more  bearableo 
Instead of the  traditional but  no  longer appropriate aivision 
of power  between executive,  legislature and  judiciary,  we  have, 
so  to speak,  a  new  division.  This shares out  power  between the 
new  European authority ana  the  old national authorities,  which 
will not  disappear,  even if they delegate part of their respon-
sibilities to it. However,  this delegation weakens  the  old 
national fabric,  which is the  one -that has  to withstand the 
stresses imposed  by  social conflict. If it were  no  longer possible, 
in a  grave  crisis,  to appeal  to national loyalt1 in order to over-
come  a  conflict that could no  longer  be  settled at the  level of 
the  interested parties,  might  this not  leaa to the dissolution 
of society as  a  homogeneous  social body  ?  Unless  one  finds,  as  a 
substitute fabric,  a  religion (Christianit1 once  played this part) 
or an ideology  (Communism  may  serve  that purpose in some  countries 
today).  But this involves  the  danger  of re-creating secular reli-
gions,  that is,  new  totalitarianismso -35-
3  - Political conditions.  Among  the political 
factors which will remain favourable  to  growth over the 
next  few  years,  we  should mention the possibilities of 
refining economic policies.  We  have  not  exhausted all 
the resources of a  delicate day-to-aay management  of 
the  econoa7.  Beside monetary ani budgetary policies, 
which  can be  appreciably improved in the  framework  of 
European union,  there is still the  prices and  incomes 
policJ,  as yet in its infancy.  Of  course,  the  foreseeable 
treni towards  a  weakening of concertation between govern-
ment,  employers'  associations ani trade  unions will not 
make  it any  the easier to applJ an incomes  policy.  But 
such policies aaJ enjoJ a  new  lease of life if we,res-
tore  the  secon&  of their objectives  (the first being the 
fight against inflation,  which  alone  has  been considered 
up  till now),  that is, the social objective of a  fairer 
iistribution of wealth.  Incomes  polic7 must  here  be  com-
binei with tax reforms. 
Another helpful factor is that Governments  have 
to mobilise  nations  through economic  and social ambi-
tions,  since territorial ambitions are ruled out  by  the 
balance of nuclear power,  so long as this lasts  (with 
the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons,  the risk of 
conflict is bouncl  to i·ncrease).  In Communist  countries, - 36-
the  demand  for political and  cultural freedom  may  of 
course  provide  other  themes  for political debate;  but 
this would  put  the  existing system in these  countries 
to  such risk that  we  may  expect their governments  to 
try and.  keep  economic  and  social objectives in the 
forefronto 
The  internal difficulties of Communist  countries 
and  of American society,  on  the other hand,  will weaken 
other political factors hitherto favourable  to growtho 
The  Communist  challenge  may  no  longer  be  so great an 
incentive,  in so far as  the  Communist  block brings out 
into the  open its dissensions  (Sino-Soviet  confronta-
tion)  and its difficulties (possibility of a  graTe 
crisis in several East European  countries,  and parti-
cularly in Yugoslavia).  As  for  the  United States, rent 
by  doubts  about their own  system,  they will no  longer 
provide  the  reassuring example  which  one  may  follow in 
order to make  a  success of industrialisationo  Europe, 
in her turn,  will have  to strike out into the  unknown, 
try out her own  experiments,  that is,  take  additional 
riskso  A great opportunity is open to her,  but at a 
price  :  are  the  Europeans  ready to  pay it ?  Further-
more,  the  "agonizing reappraisal" of American  polio,-, 
which  we  are  now  witnessing,  will haTe  negative effects 
on  growtho  The  world  monetary system,  with the dollar 
as  a  dominant  currency,  had  every possible  drawback, 
but it was  a  system,  and  therefore reassuringo  It is 
breaking down.  There is nothing to  prove  that it will 
be  replaced  by  an equally safe  system;  in any  event, 
the  creation of  a  European  currenc,- will not  by  itself -37-
achieve  this result.  In the present state of the relation-
ship between political forces, it is more  likely that we 
shall move  towards  a  division of the  world  economy  into 
two  or three large areas  (European area,  dollar area, 
possibly Japanese  area)  than towards  the  establishment of 
a  new  monetary  system managed  by  an international insti-
tution. 
The  Americans  no  longer want  to  be  the world's 
managers,  because  they are  no  longer accepted as  such and 
because  this now  costs  them  more  than it is wortho  But 
this does  not  mean  that they have  accepted subjection to 
a  common  rule,  applicable  to  them  as to other countries. 
They  will strive for a  long time yet to keep their former 
advantages without having to  bear the  cost.  This is a 
lasting focus  of infection between the  two  Atlantic dreams. 
It may  also  be  a  spur to the  achievement  of European  union, 
which  n~eds a  foil in order to progress  :  in so  far as  fear 
of the Communists  has  weakened,  opposition to America  must 
play this parto 
To  make  up  for  these negative political factors,  we 
must  therefore greatly strengthen European unity,  whose 
effects will soon wear  off if it remains  a  mere  customs 
union.  And  we  still have  to give  the Community  a  political 
form  of its owno  In our industrialised societies, political 
systems fulfil three  main  functions - a  management  function; -38-
an ideological function;  a  representative function. 
Let  us  briefly consider how  a  European Political Community 
might  make  out in each of  these  functionso 
- Management  function.  This is the  simplest,  and  the 
one  that is likely to  benefit most  from  the existence of  a 
European Community.  For  such a  Community  implies political 
power  being placed on  the  level of the  problems  which have 
to  be  resolved;  solutions to  these  problems,  whether of 
regulating the  day-to-day  economic situation,  organising 
public sector investments,  social reforms  or  development 
aid,  will be  increasingly beyond it if it remains  at the 
level of small or  medium-sized  countries.  As  an instrument 
of management,  the  Community  will thus have  effects that 
are  favourable  to growth,  but  to achieve  them,  it will 
require  a  political will which it lacks  today;  in other 
words it must  rest on popular  consent. 
- Ideological function.  A governing power  cannot 
confiDBitself  to  managing  society. It draws  the  authority, 
which it requires for  this management  function itself,  from 
its ability to mobilise  the  people  for purposes that go 
beyond  the  scope of managemento  Now  we  have  seen that in-
dustrial society was  raising more  and  more  problems  of 
purpose,  as it settled its problems  of organisation.  Of 
course,  a  democratic  government is not  expected to  define 
a  charter of doctrines,  imposed  like  a  State religion on -39-
all ita citizens.  But it must,  in its decisions,  consider 
to what  scale of values its options implicitly or expli-
citly relate. !he capitalist system gives priority to 
values that are  conducive  to efficiency;  the  communist 
system more  often refers to  values  connected with soli-
•arity. !his is not  to ear that either system has entirely 
forsaken the values which are typical of the other  :  the 
East ioes not neglect productivity and  management;  social 
security and progressive  taxation are  not  unknown  in the 
West.  It remains that the  Communist  economic  system is 
less efficient than capitalism,  because it denies itself 
the right,  for instance,  to aismiss workers,  because it 
maintains a  narrower range  of incomes  and  because it only 
makes  sparing use  of the profit motive.  The  opposite holds 
true of  the  capitalist system,  whose  greater productivity 
is bousht at the  price of greater insecurity and  less 
equality.-The  choice is between an equitable distribution 
of poverty or a  clear run for injustice in the  midst of 
plenty;  each system has its virtues and its vices. 
Efficiency and solidarity are only two  virtues among 
many.  We  have  seen the  growing  importance of a  thi~d -
responsibility.  Now  neither  communism  nor  capitalism has 
so far succeedea in spreading it wider,  except  through 
legal fictions,  which are  only fictions.  In speaking of 
responsibility,  we  mean  the responsibility of people in 
their organisations,  and  that of organisations towards 
the  people  tm, employ,  and  as regards their cultural and 
natural environment.  The  fight  against pollution,  for -40-
instance,  is part of the  scope of responsibility,  as 
much  as  the  spread of power  within the  firm. 
Finally,  a  fourth value is taking on increasing 
importance,  especially for  youth  :  this is personality, 
which differs  from  responsibility without  being too  far 
removed  from it. We  could express it as  follows  :  the 
industrial system has  overstressed one  single aspect of 
the  individual,  namely  his  capacity for  adapting to the 
system itself. Every  man  is  judged on his productivity 
or on his professional status.  In other words,  indus-
trial society has  imposed its hierarchy  and its cr±teria 
of selectiono  Now  we  see an increasing desire  to  disso-
ciate professional ani social hierarchies,  with people 
no  longer  judged on the  cubic  capacity of their cars, 
their position in the  firm or the  size of their  bank 
account. 
We  do  not  know  what  practical  forms  this  new 
aspiration will take  :  narrowing  down  of the  range  of 
incomes,  greater rotation of duties,  a  decline in the 
prestige of hierarchical authority.  Everything is 
possible;  nothing is settled.  But it is certain that 
future  political decisions will have  to  take  these  pro-
blems  into account.  We  are  already seeing in outline 
alternative patterns for  growth  :  some  more  concerned 
with personal  consumption,  others directed  towards 
productive  investments  and  othe~again towards  public 
utilities.  A clearer definition of each of these  models - 41-
is becoming  a  matter of urgenc7,  for  tomorrow  the issue 
at stake  wil~ no  longer  be  that of  choosing a  growth 
l!!!1  but of deciding on a  type of growth. !his is essen-
tiall7 a  political decision. 
- Representative function.  Western democracies 
claim as their distinctive feature  the rotation of office 
between different political parties.  In turn,  the major 
classes of the population feel they are represented in 
the  government  and  thus  concerned  by  what  happens  to all. 
Thus  we  see  enlightened conservatives and reformist socia-
lists alternating in office in most  countries  :  even if 
their style of management  differs less than their pro-
grammes,  this rotation has  a  virtue of its own;  it causes 
the different social classes to  haYe  a  share in political 
powero  Of  course,  in some  Scandinavian countries,  the 
Socialists are permanently in control politically,  but 
the  conservatives make  up  for it by  retaining in their 
own  hands  the  economic  power  whose  political implications 
have  already been set out in this report.  The  situation 
is more  dangerous in countries  (such as France)  where 
enlightened conservatism is permanently entrenched in 
office,  for  there the  same  social classes hold economic 
and political power.  This  may  lead to social alienation 
of the  otherso 
The  risk is all the greater in that the  opposition 
seems  to have  given up  hope  of office,  either because its 
goal is to  weaken  authority rather than to wield it (some -42-
"Leftists" think along such linea)  or because,  while  the 
present stage of industrialisation,  with all its stresses 
and strains,  has  to  be  completed,  one  prefers,  all things 
considered,  to  leave it to  the  Right. 
The  progressive establishment of  a  political Commu-
nity will very  quickly run up  against this difference of 
approach between the reformist Left of Northern Europe  and 
the  revolutionary Left of the South. 
A European  "government" will therefore  improve  the 
efficiency of the  management  function,  while  encountering 
new  difficulties in the ideological and representative 
functions.  The  choice  of a  new  model  for  growth  may  pro-
vide  the  occasion for  a  realignment  of forces,  but it 
would  first have  to  become  the  specific theme  of  a  poli-
tical debate.  In any  event  the  new  institutions will not 
by  themselves  be  enough  to  make  a  political Europe  come 
alive;  the  confrontation of forces  will also have  to take 
place at this level. 
X 
X  X 
If we  wanted  to sum  up  the  factors  which help or 
hinder  continued growth in Europe,  over  the  next ten 
years,  we  could  draw  up  the  following  table -~-
- Helpful factors  :  the existence of a  pool of labour 
in agriculture;  the possibility of refining economic  policies 
and of making  them  more  effective, if a  real economic  and 
monetary union is eet up  in Europe;  the fact  that political 
a~bitions remain centred in the social and  economic  fiela; 
a  balance of positive effects arising from  the  enlargement 
of markets  an4  improved  management  of firms. 
- Unhelpful factors  :  an increase in social tensions; 
progressive  change  in the scale of accepted values;  the crisis 
of the American model;  subdivision of the  world  economy; 
weakening of the Communist  challenge. 
Some  of these  unfavourable  factors,  however,  may 
become  more  favourable if we  make  new  types of growth our 
aim,  rather than achievement  of the  highest rate of growth; 
and in particular if a  substantial share of the human  and 
financial resources mobilised for  technological  chance  over 
the past centur7 is used instead for social change.  It is 
incidentally highly probable  that, if this transfer of 
resources is not  made,  growth will  come  to  a  standstill. 
!he choice  thus seems  to be  one  between growth of the pre-
sent type at a  rate of 5  ~.  with the risk of a  sudden halt, 
an4  growth at a  slower rate  (4  ~ ?)  but of a  different type 
involving less risk of seizure. 
A new  forwa!dleap of European  unio~ is only one  of 
the requirements for  continuing growth;  a  necessary  condi-
tion but  not  a  sufficient one,  which  will not  absolve  us 
from  making  difficult choices as  to patterns of growth. 
!hese choices will be  dictated by  the relationship between 
political forces. Aaaex  I 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  INDUSTRIAL  ECONOMIES  SINCE  THE  BEGINNING 
OF  THE  CENTURY 
(Annual  growth rates in ~) 
France  Germa117  u.s.A.  Italy  Britaia 
Total production 
1896  - 1929  +  1.7  - +  4.2  +  2.1  +  1 
1929  - 1963  +  2.1  - +  3  +  2.7  +  2.1 
1949 - 1963  +  4.6  +  7.8  +  3.8  +  5.8  +  2.6 
Production Eer  caEita 
1896  - 1929  +  1.5  +  1.3  +  2.1  +  1.3  +  0.5 
1929  - 1963  +  1.7  +  2.1  +  1.7  +  2  +  1.6 
1949 - 1963  +  3·7  +  6.1  +  2.1  +  5.1  +  2.1 
Production Eer  sainfullz 
employed  person 
1896  - 1929  +  1.5  +  1  +  1.8  +  1.4  +  o.6 
1929 - 1963  +  2.2  +  2.4  +  lo9  T  2e9  +  lo3 
1949 - 1963  +  4.4  +  5·3  +  2.5 
I 
+  4.9,  + 2 
Source  National studies of the Social Service Research Couacil 
project  (quoted ia "La  Croissance  fraac;aise"  by J.J. Carre, 
P.  Dubois,  E.  Malinvaud,  published  by  Editioae du Seuil)o WORLD  DIS~RIBUTION OF  WEALTH  (IN  ~) 
Population  Gross  internal 
product 
1950  1969  1950  1969 
Europe  (altogether)  31  26 
United States  8  7 
Other developed 
countries  (1)  6  6 
Under-developed 
countries  (2)  55  61 
World  100  100 
Source  :  United Nations 
(1)  Canada,  Japan,  Australia,  South Africa 
(2)  Not  including China 
37  41 
41  35 
7  10 
15  14 
100  100 
Aaaex  II 
Industrial 
production 
1950  1969 
39  48 
45  33 
7  9 
9  10 
100  100 UK SOURCE  OF  GROWft 
(annual rates for 1955-1962) 
u.s.A.  France 
Growth  in national income  +  '  ,;  +  4.82 ,; 
Labour  factor  +  1.22 ~  +  lo.35 ,; 
(of which) 
working population  +  0.7_3  ,;  +  0.09 ,; 
working  hours  - 0.20 ~  - o.o6 ; 
age  and  sex distribu-
tion  --o.o8,;  +  0.12 ,; 
workera'  qualifica-
tiona  +  0.52 ,;  +  0.29 ,; 
aigration from  rural 
- areas  +  0.2.5 - +  0.91 ,; 
Capital factor 
(of which) 
+  0.73 ,;  +  o.84 ,; 
productive capital  +  0.42  ~  +  Oo79  ,; 
invested capital  +  0.25 ~  +  o.o, , 
foreign inveat•ents  +  o.o6  ~  +  0.02 -
Size factor  +  0.30 ~  +  1.07 , 
(of which) 
increasing output  +  0.30 ,  +  0.54 ,; 
price structures  0  +  0.46 ,; 
opening of frontiers  0  +  o.o7 ,; 
Residual factor  +  0.76  ~  +  1.56 ,; 
ADD.ex  III 
GeraanJ  Ital7  Britain 
+  5·.39 ,;  +  5o78 ,;  +  2.56 " 
+  1.60 ,;  +  2.12 ,;  + o." -
+  1.1_3  ,;  +  0.20 ,;  +  0._3?  ' 
- 0.45 ,;  +  0.03 ,;  - -0._30  -
+  0.15 ,;  +  0.05 ,  - 0.02 -
+  0.11 "  +  o.4o ,;  +  0._30  • 
+  o.66 ,;  +  1.44 ,;  +  0.09 -
+  lo57 ,;  +  o.8o ,;  +  o.so ,; 
+  1.46 ~ +  0.74 ,;  +  0.57 ,; 
+  0.16  ~ +  0.11 •  +  o.o6 ; 
- 0.05 ,  - 0.05 ~  +  0.17 ,; 
+  1.3.5 ,;  +  1 •  .56  - +  0.45 ; 
+ 0.55 - +  o.6o ;  +  0.28 ; 
+  0.70 ~ +  o.8o ,;  +  0.15 ,; 
+  0.10 ,;  +  0.16 ,  +  0.02 ; 
+  o.87 ,;  +  1._30  ,  +  0.87  ~ 
Source  Denison et Poullier,  Wh7  Gro·wth  Rates Differ.  The  Brooking• 
Inatitution. l 
Germany 
llouains 
Number  of people 
to a  roo•  o.88 
Health 
(per 100,000 in-
ll.abitante) 
Doctor  a  148 
Hoapital  beda  1,084 
Es.uiE•ent 
(per 1000  in-
habitants) 
Telephone  172 
Car  199 
TeleYision  231 
Education 
Students  (out of 
1000  people in 
tae 20-24  age 
group) 
I 
82 
THE  STANDABD  OF  LIVING 
about 1967-68 
France  ItalJ  Nether-
lands 
1.01  1.14  0.76 
118  171  114 
1,120  985  714 
140  1}5  216 
223  151  165 
167  146  197 
169  80  165 
Source  Statistic• of the  European Communities 
Annex  IV 
Belgium  UoK.  UeSoA• 
0.62  0.67  0.59 
151  115  158 
827  994  840 
181  218  523 
187  196  410 
186  263  392 
128  110  404 u
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 Annex  VI 
SHARE  OF  WAGES  IN  NATIONAL  INCOME 
( :-ercentage  trends from  1950-.54  to 1960-64) 
Change  in the  share  Change  in the share 
of  wages  as part of  of  wage-earners as  Balance  national income  part of the 
population 
Belgium  5ol  1.5  +  3.6 
Norway  8.8  5·5  +  }.3 
Sweden  8.8  5·7  +  }.1 
Denmark  5.4  2.9  +  2.5 
U.K.  2  0.8  + 1.2 
Ireland  2o}  2.4  - Ool 
France  4.8  6.4  - 1.6 
Germa111  4.2  6  - 1.8 
Italy  5o4  7.2  - 1.8 
Netherlands  6.6  8.8  - 2.2 
Switzerland.  0.9  5.1  - 4.2 
Austria  ,3o6  8.4  - 4.8 
Combined.  4.8  5.1  - 0.} 
Source  OECD Annex  VII 
EMPLOYMENT  TRENDS  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
1955  1960  1965  1970 
Agriculture  24.3  ~  19.6 !I  15.9 %  13.4 % 
Ind.ustr1  40  !I  42.4  ~  43.5 !I  43.9  ~ 
Services  35·7  ~  38  !I  40o6  ~  42.7  ~ 
l 
Source  :  Statistics of the European Communities Annex  VIII 
WAGE  AND  SALARY  EARNERS 
(as a  percentage of  the  gainfully employed population) 
r 
I  1960  1970  1975 
I  %  82.6 %  84.3 %  Germany  I  7? 
France  70.1 %  ??.9 %  81.1 % 
Italy  59.4 %  68o4 %  ?lo? :1 
Netherlands  78.8 % 
I 
83e? %  85.5 % 
Belgium  76o5 %  81.2 %  83  %  I 
I 
I 
I  Luxembourg  ?0.5 %  ?6.4 %  ?9.1 % 
I 
Source  Statistics of the European Communities A
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 Annex  X 
RECENT  TRENDS  IN  GROWTH 
(annual rates) 
Average  for 
1228-2g to 
12bB- 2 
19?0  19?1  (1)  19?2  (1) 
Orisinal members  of the 
Common  Market 
France  +  5·?  +  5,9  +  5o5  +  4.5 
Germany  +  5.1  +  5.4  +  3·5  +  1.5 
Italy  +  5·?  +  5.2  +  0.5  +  3 
Belgium  +  4o?  +  6.1  +  3.?5  +  3 
Netherlands  +  5.3  +  6  +  5  +  2 
New  members  of the  Common 
Market 
Britain  +  3ol  +  2.2  +  1  +  4 
Norway  +  4o8  +  3o5  +  5o25  +  3·5 
Ireland  +  4.2  +  1.5  +  3  +  3·5 
Denmark  +  4o9  +  3.2  +  2  +  2.2 
Other  countries  I 
u.s.A.  +  4o5  - 0.7  +  3  I  +  5 
I  Japan  +  11.2  +  10.7  +  6.1 
! 
+  6 
i 
Source  OECD  to  19?0 
(1)  OECD,  EEC  and  national estimates  and  forecasts  for  1971 
and  1972. 
I Annex  XJ, 
GBOW'rH  PROSPECTS 
(annual rates) 
\ 
1970-1975  1975-198o 
Employ- Produc- Produc- Employ- Pro  duo- Produo-
ment  tivity  tion  ment  tivity  tion 
Orisinal members  of the 
Common  Market 
I  France  +  o  •. 5  +  5o4  +  5o9  +  0.7  +  5.4  +  6.1 
I  Germany  +  0.2  +  4.4  +  4.6  +  Oo2  +  4.5  +  4.7 
Italy  +  Oo8  +  4.7  +  5·5  +  0.7  +  4.8  +  5o? 
Belgium  +  Oo?  +  4  +  4.8  +  0.5  +  4  +  4.6 
Netherlands  +  1  +  3o7  +  4.?  +  1  +  3o5  +  4.5 
Luxembourg  - - +  3  - - +  3 
New  members  of the  Common 
Market 
Britain  - 0.1  +  2.9  +  2.8  +  0.6  +  2.9  +  3o5 
Norwa1  +  o.4  +  4.1  +  4.5  +  0.3  +  4  +  4.3 
Ireland  +  Oo?  +  4  +  4.7  +  0.?  +  4.1  +  4.9 
Denmark  +  0.1  +  3o7  +  3.8  +  0.1  +  3o7  +  3.8 
Other  countries 
u.s.A.  +  lo?  +  3.2  +  4.9  +  1.6  +  2.8  +  4.5 
I  Japan 
I 
+  1  +  9.4  +  10.5  +  1  +  8.4  +  9o5 
i 
Source  OECD  "Growth  in production 196Q-1980"  published in December  1970 